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NOTES
ROLLING THE "BARREL" A LITTLE FURTHER: ALLOWING
RES IPSA LOQUITUR TO ASSIST IN PROVING STRICT
LIABILITY IN TORT MANUFACTURING DEFECTS*
In England in 1863, a barrel of flour rolled out of the second
floor of a barn, struck a passerby walking underneath, and, as
William Prosser said, rolled "into the lives of all tort lawyers."1
Faced with this wayward barrel, the English court crafted the
now-famous tort doctrine of res ipsa loquitur' The court held
that the peculiar circumstances of the accident generated a pre-
sumption of negligence, allowing recovery even though the
plaintiff could not prove negligence directly' One hundred years
later, Chief Justice Traynor of the California Supreme Court
ushered in a new liability scheme, holding a manufacturer of a
power tool strictly liable in tort for a defective product without
requiring any showing of fault on the part of the manufacturer.'
Res ipsa loquitur and strict liability in tort for defective prod-
ucts may appear to be distinct legal constructs, yet both spring
from the same doctrinal foundation in that they assist plaintiffs
in establishing liability when direct proof is beyond their reach.'
* Special thanks to Professor Paul A. LeBel, Cutler Professor of Law at the Col-
lege of William and Mary School of Law, for his invaluable advice on earlier drafts
of this Note.
1. 1 STUART M. SPEISER, THE NEGLIGENCE CASE: RES IPSA LOQUITUR § 1:2, at 6
(1972) (citing William L. Prosser, Res Ipsa Loquitur in California, 37 CAL. L. REV.
183, 183 (1949)).
2. See Byrne v. Boadle, 159 Eng. Rep. 299, 300-01 (Ex. 1863).
3. See id.
4. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 901 (Cal. 1962)
(holding that liability for defective products should be governed "by the law of strict
liability in tort" and not by contract law).
5. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORT: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. a (Tentative
Draft No. 2, 1995) ("Strict liability performs a function similar to the concept of
res ipsa loquitur, allowing deserving plaintiffs to succeed notwithstanding what
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Res ipsa loquitur, as embraced by modern American courts, al-
lows the court to infer a defendant's negligence absent clear
proof of negligent conduct.6 Strict liability abandons a conduct-
based approach, instead allowing a plaintiff to recover by show-
ing that a product was defective and unreasonably dangerous
when it left the manufacturer. An early products liability case
decided by the California Supreme Court highlighted the simi-
larities that exist between these two important tort doctrines.8
In the early 1940s, Gladys Escola, a waitress, was transfer-
ring Coca-Cola bottles from a shipping carton into the refrigera-
tor when one of the bottles exploded, cutting her hand severely
She sued the bottling company for negligence and, relying on the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, prevailed before the trial court and
the California Court of Appeals. 0
Chief Justice Gibson, writing for the California Supreme
Court, affirmed the lower courts' decisions." More importantly,
the language of his opinion highlighted the similarities that ex-
ist between res ipsa loquitur and strict products liability. Chief
Justice Gibson engaged in a two-part analysis. 2 He first deter-
mined that because the bottle was not damaged "after delivery
to the restaurant by the defendant ... it follow[ed] ... that the
bottle was in some manner defective at the time defendant relin-
quished control, because sound and properly prepared bottles of
carbonated liquids do not ordinarily explode when carefully han-
dled."13 He then noted that the defendant could have been neg-
ligent in two different ways: either the defendant overcharged a
safe bottle or failed to discover a properly charged but defective-
would otherwise be difficult or insuperable problems of proof.").
6. See 1 SPEISER, supra note 1, § 1:1, at 3-4.
7. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965); infra note 33 and accom-
panying text. Not all states have followed the Restatement definition of strict liabili-
ty. See infra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
8. See Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1944) (affirming a
judgment for a plaintiff under res ipsa loquitur).
9. See id. at 437-38.
10. See id. at 437, 440.
11. See id. at 440.
12. See id. at 439-40.
13. Id. at 439 (emphasis added).
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ly made bottle.'4 The Chief Justice concluded that sufficient
evidence existed for a jury to infer that a defect existed in the
bottle and to infer further that the defendant's conduct was
negligent. 5
Then-justice Traynor concurred in the judgment. 6 Traynor
argued that strict liability, not res ipsa loquitur, should be used
to establish negligence for any injury caused by a product de-
fect." He noted that negligence approached strict liability be-
cause, procedurally, the jury was left with the ultimate power to
determine whether the defendant had refuted the inference of
negligence. 8 Traynor's concurrence suggested that both doc-
trines, res ipsa loquitur and the strict liability system that he
envisioned, should be available to aid the plaintiff in establish-
ing the cause of the injury."' He favored a strict liability system
because some causes of accidents cannot be attributed to negli-
gence "even by the device of res ipsa loquitur,"0 and the ability
to determine the cause of the defect should not control whether
a plaintiff could recover.2' Justice Traynor's espousal of a strict
liability system, therefore, rested at least in part on the same
premise as the English court's decision one hundred years earli-
er to create the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur; namely, a legal re-
covery on account of injury should not be barred by lack of proof
when the defendant has better knowledge or access to knowl-
edge regarding the cause of the accident.22
14. See id. at 439-40.
15. See id.
16. See id. at 440 (Traynor, J., concurring).
17. See id. at 440-41 (Traynor, J., concurring). Justice Traynor's concurrence fore-
shadowed his decision to impose strict liability for defective products in California
almost 20 years later. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 901
(Cal. 1962).
18. See Escola, 150 P.2d at 441 (Traynor, J., concurring).
19. See id. (Traynor, J., concurring).
20. Id. (Traynor, J., concurringi.
21. See id. (Traynor, J., concurring).
22. In Christie v. Griggs, 170 Eng. Rep. 1088 (K.B. 1809), an English decision pre-
dating Byrne v. Boadle, the court justified shifting the burden of persuasion over to
the defendant because in many accidents it may be impossible for the plaintiff to
produce the required evidence. See id. at 1088. Justice Traynor's concurrence noted
that an injured individual is ordinarily unable to identify the cause of a defect be-
cause of unfamiliarity with the manufacturing process. See Escola, 150 P.2d at 441
(Traynor, J., concurring).
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Despite the similar purposes of the strict liability and res ipsa
loquitur doctrines, confusion exists over whether to allow res
ipsa loquitur to play a role in proving a product defect in a strict
liability claim. Louisiana and several other states have recog-
nized the utility of res ipsa in a strict liability setting.' Other
states, such as California, have rejected the cross-application of
the doctrine.'
This Note outlines the various state approaches to cross-appli-
cation and proposes that res ipsa loquitur be available to plain-
tiffs who file manufacturing defect strict liability claims. More
specifically, this Note proposes a substantively and procedurally
modified res ipsa doctrine tailored to proving manufacturing de-
fects and furthering the social policy goals inherent in the strict
products liability system.
The first section of this Note traces the historical evolution of
res ipsa loquitur and strict products liability. The res ipsa loqui-
tur discussion focuses on the several variations of the test that
courts require plaintiffs to meet in order to qualify for a res ipsa
loquitur instruction, as well as the varying procedural effects
courts historically have given the doctrine. The strict products
liability discussion traces the development of the strict liability
tort doctrine and outlines the differing state approaches to strict
products liability.
The second section of this Note begins by briefly discussing
the existing commentary regarding the applicability of res ipsa
loquitur in a strict products liability claim. The section then out-
lines approaches states have taken regarding whether the doc-
trine of res ipsa loquitur can be used to prove defect under a
strict products liability theory. The section discusses the states
that allow the doctrine to be employed, as well as the states that
clearly have restricted the use of the doctrine to negligence theo-
ry. It also analyzes state court opinions that have embraced or
rejected only implicitly the use of res ipsa in strict liability
claims.
The third section of this Note briefly outlines the traditional
policy rationales for strict products liability. This section then
23. See infra text accompanying notes 142-58.
24. See infra text accompanying notes 84-141.
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critiques the various state approaches to the question, and in so
doing briefly touches on some of the policy bases for the proposal
outlined in the final section of the Note.
Finally, this Note proposes that res ipsa loquitur be allowed to
assist in proving manufacturing defects in a strict liability claim
under a new two-tiered presumption analysis tailored for strict
products liability settings. This proposal is consistent with the
policy goals justifying the imposition of strict liability for manu-
facturing defects and will further those goals by making strict
products liability for manufacturing defects more strict.
THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR AND
STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY
Res Ipsa Loquitur
Res ipsa loquitur, or "the thing speaks for itself," is a species
of circumstantial evidence developed at common law to help a
plaintiff prove negligence.' The English roots of the doctrine
are easily summarized. In Byrne v. Boadle," the court found
the defendant negligent under the principle of res ipsa loquitur
even though the plaintiff could not prove affirmatively that neg-
ligent conduct caused the barrel to fall." The court concluded
that, when such an accident occurs, the mere happening of the
event presupposes negligence.' Two years later, Chief Justice
Erle, in Scott v. London & St. Katherine Docks Co.,2  articulat-
ed the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur fully by holding:
There must be reasonable evidence of negligence. But
where the thing is sh[olwn to be under the management of
the defendant or his servants, and the accident is such as in
the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who
have the management use proper care, it affords reasonable
evidence, in the absence of explanation by the defendants,
that the accident arose from want of care.3"
25. See, e.g., Prosser, supra note 1, at 184-85.
26. 159 Eng. Rep. 299 (Ex. 1863).
27. See id at 300 ("There are certain cases of which it may be said res ipsa lo-
quitur, and this seems one of them.").
28. See id. at 300-01.
29. 159 Eng. Rep. 665 (L.R.-Ex. 1865).
30. Id. at 667; see generally MARK SHAIN, RES IPSA LOQUITUR 85-112 (1945) (dis-
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Thus, the doctrine gives the plaintiff the ability to prove negli-
gence when the specific facts necessary to prove negligence are
unavailable.
In the United States, almost every state has embraced the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.3' The traditional view in the Unit-
ed States has been that for a plaintiff to use the doctrine suc-
cessfully, the plaintiff must prove that (1) the event is not one
that normally occurs absent negligence, (2) the event is attribut-
able to an agency or instrumentality within the defendant's
exclusive control, and (3) the plaintiff has not voluntarily con-
tributed to the accident-causing event.32 The Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts test for res ipsa loquitur is similar to the tradition-
al view but does not require that the defendant have exclusive
control over the instrumentality." Court opinions in eight
states have indicated some support for the Restatement test,
34
cussing more fully the creation of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in England and
describing court decisions prior to Boadle that invoked the doctrine).
31. According to Stuart Speiser, only Michigan, Pennsylvania, and South Carolina
do not officially recognize the doctrine. Michigan courts, however, use the doctrine
anyway. See Wischmeyer v. Schanz, 536 N.W.2d 760, 767 (1995); 1 SPEISER, supra
note 1, § 6:38. Pennsylvania courts apply an analogous doctrine. See Gilbert v.
Korvette, Inc., 327 A.2d 94, 98 (1974); 1 SPEISER, supra note 1, § 6:69. South Caroli-
na courts have recognized the ability to prove negligence inferentially. See 1
SPEISER, supra note 1, § 6:71.
32. See 2 MARSHALL S. SHAPO, THE LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILrY % 24.02 (3d ed. 1994).
33. The Restatement (Second) of Torts section 328D allows a jury to find the de-
fendant negligent when:
(a) the event is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the ab-
sence of negligence;
(b) other responsible causes, including the conduct of the plaintiff
and third persons, are sufficiently eliminated by the evidence; and
(c) the indicated negligence is within the scope of the defendant's
duty to the plaintiff.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328D (1965).
34. See Ward v. Forrester Day Care, Inc., 547 So. 2d 410, 413 (Ala. 1989) (refer-
ring favorably to the factors in the Restatement); Branco E. Co. v. Leffler, 482 P.2d
364, 367 (Colo. 1971) (using the Restatement test); Ginn v. Penobscot Co., 334 A.2d
874, 880 (Me. 1975) (citing the Restatement definition with approval), modified, 342
A.2d 270 (Me. 1975); Enrich v. Windmere Corp., 616 N.E.2d 1081, 1085 (Mass. 1993)
(referring to the Restatement factors but not stating that Massachusetts applies this
test); Valley Properties Ltd. Partnership v. Steadman's Hardware, Inc., 824 P.2d 250,
254 (Mont. 1992) (upholding a lower court's use of the Restatement definition); Jones
v. Harrisburg Polyclinic Hosp., 437 A.2d 1134, 1136 (Pa. 1981) (stating that Pennsyl-
vania has adopted the Restatement test); Konicki v. Lawrence, 475 A.2d 208, 210
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and one other state court has commented favorably on the Re-
statement test even though the state does not officially recognize
the res ipsa doctrine as outlined in the Restatement.35 Some
states have, at times, added a fourth requirement to the Re-
statement test: that explanatory evidence be more readily acces-
sible to the defendant than to the plaintiff.6 This element has
not been applied uniformly even among states embracing the
fourth element."
Courts in the United States have varied the procedural effect
of res ipsa loquitur over time.3" Initially, courts followed the
(R.I. 1984) (stating that Rhode Island has adopted the Restatement test); Provident
Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Professional Cleaning Serv., Inc., 396 S.W.2d 351, 355
(Tenn. 1965) (embracing the Restatement view by deemphasizing exclusive control).
35. See Jones v. Porretta, 405 N.W.2d 863, 872 n.6 (Mich. 1987) (relegating the
Restatement factors to a footnote).
36. See Ray v. Ameri-Care Hosp., 400 So. 2d 1127, 1133 (La. Ct. App. 1981) (re-
quiring that the explanation of the accident be more readily available to the defen-
dant); Wilson v. Stilwill, 309 N.W.2d 898, 905 (Mich. 1981) (listing this element as
one requirement); Bass v. Nooney Co., 646 S.W.2d 765, 768 (Mo. 1983) (listing this
element as part of the test); Otis Elevator Co. v. Reid, 706 P.2d 1378, 1380 & n.1
(Nev. 1985) (upholding a jury instruction stating that the jury must find that the
defendant is better able to explain the event than the plaintiff); Goedert v. Newcas-
tle Equip. Co., 802 P.2d 157, 160 (Wyo. 1990) (requiring a showing that the defen-
dant had superior knowledge before allowing the doctrine to be applied); see also
Buckelew v. Grossbard, 435 A.2d 1150, 1157 (N.J. 1981) (discussing superior knowl-
edge as a policy but not listing it as a factor); Taylor v. City of Beardstown, 491
N.E.2d 803, 809 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986) (discussing access to explanatory evidence but
not listing it as a factor); see generally 1 SPEISER, supra note 1, § 2:27 (discussing
states that require this fourth element).
37. Two Wisconsin cases illustrate the inconsistent use of this fourth requirement.
Compare Szafranski v. Radetzky, 141 N.W.2d 902, 908 (Wis. 1966) (concluding that
the doctrine is only available "when the conduct is peculiarly within the knowledge
of the defendant"), with American Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Dobrzynski, 277 N.W.2d
749, 752-53 (Wis. 1979) (applying the traditional test); see also 1 SPEISER, supra note
1, § 2:27 n.15 (listing state cases rejecting this requirement). Page Keeton has criti-
cized the requirement that the plaintiff demonstrate that the defendant has greater
access to information regarding the event. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER
AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 39, at 254-55 (5th ed. 1984). The Restatement
res ipsa test reflects Prosser's view. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328D
cmt. g (1965) (eschewing an exclusive control requirement).
38. This Note refers repeatedly to the procedural effect given to res ipsa loquitur
in various states. Three different levels of procedural effect are relevant. First, refer-
ence in this Note to shifting the burden of proof, or the full burden, to the defen-
dant means that the defendant has the burden of production as well as the burden
of persuasion on the issue. See infra note 39 and accompanying text. Second, refer-
ence to the defendant having the burden of going forward with the evidence means
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English rule that proving the elements of the doctrine created a
legal presumption of negligence, shifting the burden of proof to
the defendant to prove himself free of negligence. 9 Currently,
state courts are split regarding the procedural effect of res ipsa
loquitur. The majority view is that the doctrine permits a jury to
find negligence but does not command that the jury do so."
Under this view, the doctrine does not shift the burden of proof.
The defendant may be deemed to have the burden of going for-
ward with the evidence, but only in the sense that failure to put
in evidence to counter the permissible inference of negligence
raised by the plaintiff may allow the jury to return an unfavor-
able verdict.4 In Sweeney v. Erving,42 the Supreme Court em-
braced this view of res ipsa loquitur, noting that the doctrine
only allows an inference of negligence and does not force an ex-
planation from the defendant."
A minority of states have given the doctrine a greater proce-
dural effect." In California, the doctrine creates a rebuttable
presumption of negligence, and the jury must presume the con-
duct sued upon to be negligent unless the defendant puts on evi-
dence to counter the presumption." Several other states have
that, unless otherwise indicated, the defendant is not required to come forward with
exculpatory evidence but risks a contrary verdict if he chooses not to provide any
evidence. See 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 338, at 435-36 (John W. Strong et al.
eds., 4th ed. 1992) (noting that when most courts talk of the burden of going for-
ward with evidence they do not mean that the defendant must come forward with
evidence, only that if the defendant does not come forward, he runs the risk of an
adverse jury verdict). Third, reference to the defendant having the burden of produc-
tion means that the defendant must put forth legally sufficient evidence or suffer a
directed verdict in favor of the plaintiff. See id. § 338, at 432-33.
39. See SHAIN, supra note 30, at 112-20 & n.161; 1 SPEISER, supra note 1, § 1:2,
at 7; see also Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Mattice, 243 S.W.2d 15, 19-20 (Ark. 1951)
(outlining the historical development of the rule).
40. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 37, § 40, at 257-58; see also 1 SPEISER, supra
note 1, § 3:4 n.18 (listing cases that follow this majority view).
41. See Eaton v. Eaton, 575 A.2d 858, 864 (N.J. 1990) (quoting Lorenc v. Chemirad
Corp., 179 A.2d 401, 409 (N.J. 1962)) (discussing the practical consequences of the
burden of going forward with evidence); 1 SPEISER, supra note 1, § 3:14.
42. 228 U.S. 233 (1913).
43. See id. at 240-41. This holding marked a shift in the Supreme Court's view of
the doctrine's procedural effects. Earlier Supreme Court opinions had followed the
English view giving the doctrine a presumptive effect. See SHAIN, supra note 30, at
120 n.161.
44. See infra notes 45-46.
45. See Newing v. Cheatham, 540 P.2d 33, 42-43 (Cal. 1975); see also CAL. EVID.
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gone even further and held that the doctrine Shifts the burden of
persuasion over to the defendant." Any attempt to analyze
state court decisions is problematic, however, given the courts'
imprecise uses of the terms "presumption" and "inference."47
Two court opinions applying Illinois law. illustrate the confusion.
In a recent federal case, the court concluded that res ipsa loqui-
tur created a presumption of negligence;48 an earlier state court
opinion, however, had held that the doctrine only created an
inference of negligence.49 Despite state differences regarding
the proper elements of the doctrine and its procedural effect, res
ipsa loquitur remains an important inferential doctrine and
should be expanded beyond the negligence realm to serve limit-
ed duty in the strict liability setting.
Strict Products Liability
In the last several hundred years, manufacturer liability has
swung from strict liability to fault-based liability and back to
strict liability." During the eighteenth century, manufacturers
were held strictly liable for any defects in their products regard-
less of fault.5 Slowly, an emphasis on fault developed in the
CODE §§ 604, 646 (West 1995) (outlining the procedural rules regarding res ipsa lo-
quitur and presumptions affecting the burden of production).
46. See Schmidt v. Gibbs, 807 S.W.2d 928, 931 (Ark. 1991); Stone's Farm Supply,
Inc. v. Deacon, 805 P.2d 1109, 1114 (Colo. 1991); Weiss v. Axler, 328 P.2d 88, 96-97
(Colo. 1958); Wellington Assocs., Inc. v. Capital Fire Protection Co., 594 A.2d 1089,
1092 (Me. 1991). But see Corbett v. Curtis, 225 A.2d 402, 405 (Me. 1967) (quoting
Cratty v. Samuel Aceto & Co., 116 A.2d 623, 627 (Me. 1955)) (stating that the bur-
den of evidence shifts to the defendant); Toussant v. Guice, 414 So. 2d 850, 854 (La.
Ct. App. 1982); see generally KEETON ET AL., supra note 37, § 40, at 258-59 (dis-
cussing the burden shifts in Louisiana, Colorado, and Mississippi).
47. See George S. Goodspeed, Jr., Comment, Application of the Doctrine of Res
Ipsa Loquitur to Food Cases, 3 MIAMI L.Q. 613, 621 (1949).
48. See Neace v. Laimans, 951 F.2d 139, 141 (7th Cir. 1991). But see id. (referring
to "a presumption of negligence" and an "inference of negligence" within the same
paragraph).
49. See Dyback v. Weber, 500 N.E.2d 8, 12 (Ill. 1986) (discussing the inference of
negligence created by the doctrine in Illinois).
50. See infra notes 51-67 and accompanying text.
51. See David P. Griffith, Note, Products Liability-Negligence Presumed: An Evo-
lution, 67 TEX. L. REV. 851, 851-52 & n.1 (1989). For a fuller discussion of the his-
torical development of strict products liability prior to section 402A of the Restate-
ment, see 1 SHAPO, supra note 32, 7.01. See also KEETON ET AL., supra note 37, §
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law, coinciding with the Industrial Revolution.52 A dramatic
shift in products liability law occurred with the now-famous
English decision of Winterbottom v. Wright,53 which insulated
product manufacturers from liability unless privity existed be-
tween the manufacturer and the buyer of the merchandise.'
The privity requirement remained inviolate in the United States
until 1960."5
In 1960, the New Jersey Supreme Court, in Henningsen v.
Bloomfield Motors, Inc.,6 abandoned the contractual privity re-
quirement and held that the ultimate buyer of an injury-causing
product could sue the manufacturer directly.57 The court al-
lowed such claims to go forward under a warranty theory of
contract liability.58 Just two years later, the California Supreme
Court rejected the contractual basis altogether in favor of a
strict liability in tort theory of recovery. 9 Chief Justice Traynor
argued that manufacturers should be strictly liable for placing
products on the market that they know will not be inspected
prior to resale.6"
Chief Justice Traynor's opinion ushered in the current phase
of strict products liability. Three years later, the Restatement
(Second) of Torts codified Justice Traynor's approach in section
402A.6 Under the Restatement view:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unrea-
97, at 690-92 (discussing the history of strict liability in warranty).
52. See Charles 0. Gregory, Trespass to Negligence to Absolute Liability, 37 VA. L.
REV. 359, 365-70 (1951) (discussing American court opinions that emphasized the
need for a system based on fault); Joseph H. King, Jr., A Goals-Oriented Approach
to Strict Tort Liability for Abnormally Dangerous Activities, 48 BAYLOR L. REv. 341,
344-45 (1996) (discussing fault-based tort liability as an outgrowth of the Industrial
Revolution).
53. 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842).
54. See id. at 405; see generally John Minor Wisdom, Admiralty Jurisdiction and
Products Liability: Economic Loss, 62 TUL. L. REV. 325, 326-27 (1988) (explaining
the development of the contractual privity requirement for warranty-based claims).
55. See infra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
56. 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960).
57. See id. at 100-01.
58. See id.
59. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1962).
60. See id. at 900.
61. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
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sonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property
is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the
ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a
product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer
without substantial change in the condition in which it is
sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the prepara-
tion and sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from
or entered into any contractual relation with the seller.6 2
Most states have adopted some form of strict products liability,
and the vast majority of states have expressly endorsed the sec-
tion 402A test of strict liability.' Of the states that have not
62. Id. For a discussion of the policy rationales behind the creation of this doc-
trine, see id. cmt. c and infra notes 226-32 and accompanying text.
63. Most states that have adopted the Restatement section 402A test have done so
judicially. See O.S. Stapley Co. v. Miller, 447 P.2d 248, 251-52 (Ariz. 1968); Hilgel v.
General Motors Corp., 544 P.2d 983, 987 (Colo. 1976); Garthwait v. Burgio, 216 A.2d
189, 192 (Conn. 1965); Payne v. Soft Sheen Prods., Inc., 486 A.2d 712, 720-26 (D.C.
1985); West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So. 2d 80, 87 (Fla. 1976); Shields v. Mor-
ton Chem. Co., 518 P.2d 857, 859-60 (Idaho 1974); Suvada v. White Motor Co., 210
N.E.2d 182, 187-88 (Ill. 1965); Hawkeye-Sec. Ins. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 174 N.W.2d
672, 684 (Iowa 1970); Brooks v. Dietz, 545 P.2d 1104, 1108 (Kan. 1976); Dealers
Transp. Co., v. Battery Distrib. Co., 402 S.W.2d 441 (Ky. 1966); Phipps v. General
Motors Corp., 363 A.2d 955, 963 (Md. 1976);. McCormack v. Hankscraft Co., 154
N.W.2d 488, 500-01 (Minn. 1967); State Stove Mfg. v. Hodges, 189 So. 2d 113, 118
(Miss. 1966); Keener v. Dayton Elec. Mfg., 445 S.W.2d 362, 364-65 (Mo. 1969);
Brandenburger v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 513 P.2d 268, 272 (Mont. 1973);
Buttrick v. Arthur Lessard & Sons, 260 A.2d 111, 113-14 (N.H. 1969); Stang v.
Hertz Corp., 497 P.2d 732, 737 (N.M. 1972); Robinson v. Reed-Prentice Div. of Pack-
age Mach. Co., 403 N.E.2d 440, 443 (N.Y. 1980); Johnson v. American Motors Corp.,
225 N.W.2d 57, 66 (N.D. 1974); Heaton v. Ford Motor Co., 435 P.2d 806, 808 (Or.
1967) (en banc); Ritter v. Narragansett Elec. Co., 283 A.2d 255, 261 (R.I. 1971);
Engberg v. Ford Motor Co., 205 N.W.2d 104, 109 (S.D. 1973); Olney v. Beaman Bot-
tling Co., 418 S.W.2d 430, 431 (Tenn. 1967); McKisson v. Sales Affiliates, Inc., 416
S.W.2d 787, 789-90 (Tex. 1967); Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v. Armco Steel Co., 601 P.2d
152, 158 (Utah 1979); Zaleskie v. Joyce, 333 A.2d 110, 113-14 (Vt. 1975); Dippel v.
Sciano, 155 N.W.2d 55, 63 (Wis. 1967); Ogle v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 716 P.2d
334, 341 (Wyo. 1986); see also Kirkland v. General Motors Corp., 521 P.2d 1353,
1362-65 (Okla. 1974) (adopting the Manufacturers' Products Liability Doctrine and
using the standard of proof found in the Restatement).
Several other states have adopted identical or functionally identical language by
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expressly adopted the Restatement doctrine of strict products
liability, several states in the group have adopted the Restate-
ment view but omitted the requirement that the product be "un-
reasonably dangerous."' Several other states have adopted
strict liability doctrines similar to the doctrine articulated in the
Restatement.' Only two states, North Carolina and Virginia,
have not embraced strict liability in tort.66 In Virginia, how-
statute. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-86-102 (Michie 1996); IND. CODE ANN. § 33-1-1.5-3
(Michie Supp. 1996); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 221 (West 1980); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 27-1-719 (1995); OR. REV. STAT. § 30.920 (1988); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-73-10
(Law Co-op. 1976); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.72.030 (West 1992). For a more de-
tailed state-by-state analysis of strict products liability especially as it relates to
state approaches regarding admissibility of state of the art evidence, see Robert Dale
Klein, 'Old Products. The Admissibility of State of the Art Evidence in Product Lia-
bility Cases, 9 J. PROD. LIAB. 233, 246-74 (1986).
64. In the following cases, states have adopted standards that exclude the "unrea-
sonably dangerous" requirement. See Clary v. Fifth Ave. Chrysler Ctr., Inc., 454 P.2d
244, 248 (Alaska 1969); Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 900
(Cal. 1962); Stewart v. Budget Rent-A-Car Corp., 470 P.2d 240; 243 (Haw. 1970);
Kohler v. Ford Motor Co., 191 N.W.2d 601, 606-07 (Neb. 1971); Shoshone Coca-Cola
Bottling Co. v. Dolinski, 420 P.2d 855, 857 (Nev. 1966); Codling v. Paglia, 298
N.E.2d 622, 624 (N.Y. 1973); Knitz v. Minster Mach. Co., 432 N.E.2d 814, 817-18
(Ohio 1982); see also Berkebile v. Brantly Helicopter Corp., 337 A.2d 893, 900 (Pa.
1975) (holding that the standard was whether the product was "safe for use");
Morningstar v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 253 S.E.2d 666, 683-84 (W. Va. 1979)
(adopting a "not reasonably safe for its intended use" standard).
65. See Casrell v. Altec Indus., Inc., 335 So. 2d 128, 132-33 (Ala. 1976) (adopting
the "extended manufacturer's liability doctrine"); Cline v. Prowler Indus., 418 A.2d
968, 980 (Del. 1980) (holding that the Delaware U.C.C., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 2-
101 to 2-725 (1993), preempts strict products liability actions for the sale of goods);
Martin v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., 353 A.2d 581, 584-87 (Del. 1976) (adopting a
doctrine similar to the California approach for bailors and lessors); Center Chem. Co.
v. Parzini, 218 S.E.2d 580, 582 (Ga. 1975) (applying GA. CODE ANN. § 105-106
(1968), a precursor of GA. CODE ANN. § 51-1-11 (1982), to create a doctrine of strict
products liability when the product is "not merchantable and reasonably suited to
the use intended'"); Back v. Wickes Corp., 378 N.E.2d 964, 969 (Mass. 1978) (com-
menting that MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 106, § 2-314 (West 1990), which created
strict liability under a warranty theory, is sufficiently similar to the Restatement to
allow the court to look to rulings on the Restatement from other jurisdictions for
guidance); Spence v. Three Rivers Builders & Masonry Supply, Inc., 90 N.W.2d 873
(Mich. 1958) (basing strict liability on a warranty theory but abolishing the privity
requirement); Cepeda v. Cumberland Eng'g Co., 386 A.2d 816, 821 (N.J. 1978) (ap-
proving of the Restatement test); Landry v. Bill Garrett Chevrolet, Inc., 430 So. 2d
1051, 1057-59 (La. Ct. App. 1983) (noting that under Louisiana law the injury must
have been foreseeable to the defendant to invoke strict liability).
66. See, e.g., Foyle v. Lederle Lab., 674 F. Supp. 530, 535 (E.D.N.C. 1987);
Goodbar v. Whitehead Bros., 591 F. Supp. 552, 555 (W.D. Va. 1984).
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ever, at least one court has noted the similarity between the
Virginia approach and the Restatement.67 Thus, most states
have embraced both res ipsa and strict products liability. It is
the interrelation between these two legal theories that has gen-
erated scholarly and judicial confusion.
THE APPLICABILITY OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR IN A STRICT
LIABILITY SETTING
Current Legal Scholarship
Little scholarly research has been done on the compatibility of
res ipsa loquitur and strict liability. William Prosser has written
that, "[sltrictly speaking, since proof of negligence is not in is-
sue, res ipsa loquitur has no application to strict liability; but
the inferences which are the core of the doctrine remain, and are
no less applicable. " ' Several state courts have embraced
Prosser's view in grappling with the issue, 9 and it has been fol-
lowed by Frank Hills in his practice-oriented treatise on strict
products liability cases. 0 Two commentators analyzing defec-
tive product claims, however, recently came to the exact opposite
conclusion: res ipsa loquitur could not be used in a strict liability
context.'
Another survey of the law of products liability has approached
the question differently, focusing on the procedural implications
of the doctrine.72 The authors conclude that if res ipsa gener-
ates an inference of negligence it is permissible to use the doc-
67. See Bly v. Otis Elevator Co., 713 F.2d 1040, 1045 n.6 (4th Cir. 1983) (stating that
Virginia's imposition of warranty liability for personal injuries resulting from defective
products is the "functional equivalent" of strict liability under the Restatement).
68. WILLAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 103, at 672-73 (4th
ed. 1971). This early edition is cited because certain courts have quoted this phrase
when discussing the compatibility of res ipsa and strict products liability. See, e.g.,
Williams v. Smart Chevrolet Co., 730 S.W.2d 479, 482 (Ark. 1987); Mays v. Ciba-Geigy
Corp., 661 P.2d 348, 358 (Kan. 1983). The latest edition does not discuss the compati-
bility of res ipsa and strict liability. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 37, § 103.
69. See infra notes 162 and 164 and accompanying text.
70. FRANK S. HILLS, HANDLING THE STRICT LIABILITY PRODUCTS CASE 220 (1980).
71. See RAYMOND PAUL JOHNSON & MIKE EIDSON, DEFECTIVE PRODUCT. EVIDENCE
TO VERDICT 31 (1995).
72. See 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 17.62 (Timothy E. Travers et
al. eds., 3d ed. 1987).
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trine in strict liability claims, but if the doctrine generates a
presumption of negligence then res ipsa loquitur cannot be ap-
plied in such a claim. 3
Finally, Thomas Cowan, in a law review article published
shortly after the Restatement incarnation of strict products lia-
bility surfaced, envisioned the future use of res ipsa loquitur to
prove product defects as the strict liability system moved toward
a purely compensation-driven form. 4 Although he did not ex-
plicitly endorse the doctrine's use, Cowan implicitly favored
allowing res ipsa to prove defectiveness because such use fur-
thered his compensation-based model of strict liability.75
Thus, current commentary has failed to provide a clear an-
swer to the question of res ipsa/strict liability cross-applicability.
The remainder of this section explores various approaches that
states have taken in directly or indirectly discussing the issue.
State Approaches
An analysis of state approaches reveals that they provide no
more definitive answer than do current commentaries. Some
states clearly have allowed res ipsa loquitur in strict liability
claims," and other states have disallowed the doctrine out-
right.77 Between those two extremes, court opinions from still
more states have implicitly favored or disfavored the extension
of res ipsa loquitur beyond negligence claims.7" A majority of
states have not decided definitively whether res ipsa loquitur
can be used to prove defect in a strict liability setting.79 Only
about one third of the states have issued rulings that at least
suggest whether res ipsa loquitur will be available to plaintiffs
73. See id.
74. See Thomas A. Cowan, Some Policy Bases of Products Liability, 17 STAN. L.
REV. 1077, 1094 (1965).
75. See id.
76. See infra notes 142-58 and accompanying text.
77. See infra notes 87-141 and accompanying text.
78. See infra notes 159-219 and accompanying text.
79. See, e.g., Dutsch v. Sea Ray Boats, Inc., 845 P.2d 187, 190 (Okla. 1992) (not-
ing that the application of res ipsa loquitur to actions in strict liability was undecid-
ed in that state); cf infra notes 80, 87-225 and accompanying text.
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in strict liability product defect actions." Even in those states
that have decided, a clear understanding of the approaches re-
mains elusive because courts have focused on procedural issues
as well as the role of circumstantial evidence in proving defec-
tiveness. States are divided over whether circumstantial evi-
dence can be used to prove product defects."' To confuse the
analysis further, different states give res ipsa loquitur different
procedural effects82 and use different tests for the doctrine as
well." Regardless of the confusion, given that state courts have
focused primarily on those factors mentioned above, the analysis
of state court approaches will center around the treatment that
state courts have given those issues.
States Declining to Recognize Res Ipsa Loquitur in Strict
Products Liability Claims
State courts have used various bases for excluding res ipsa
loquitur from the strict liability setting. Courts have rejected the
doctrine because of procedural concerns," because of the belief
80. See infra notes 87-225 and accompanying text.
81. See, e.g., Lee v. Crookston Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 188 N.W.2d 426, 432 (Minn.
1971) (noting that the fact of the accident alone rarely suffices to show the existence
of defect at the time the defendant relinquished control); Scanlon v. General Motors
Corp., 326 A.2d 673, 677 (N.J. 1974) (stating that the mere occurrence of the acci-
dent is not usually sufficient absent additional circumstantial evidence to show de-
fect); Gunstone v. Julius Blum GMbH.a-6873, 825 P.2d 1389, 1393 (Or. Ct. App.
1992) (concluding that the facts of the accident do not prove defect if a plaintiff has
pled a specific defect). But see Caprara v. Chrysler Corp., 423 N.Y.S.2d 694, 697
(N.Y. App. Div. 1979) (noting that if a plaintiff can prove that the product did not
perform as intended and can exclude all other potential causes not attributable to
the defendant then an inference of defect will be allowed).
82. Compare Domany v. Otis Elevator Co., 369 F.2d 604, 612 (6th Cir. 1966)
(stating that, under Ohio law, the doctrine only creates a permissible inference of
negligence), with Newing v. Cheatham, 540 P.2d 33, 42-43 (Cal. 1975) (en bane)
(noting that res ipsa loquitur is given a presumptive effect in California).
83. Compare Khirieh v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 594 So. 2d 1220, 1223
(Ala. 1992) (applying the traditional test focusing on exclusive control, the plaintiffs
conduct, and an accident that would not normally occur absent negligence), with
Wells v. Woman's Hosp. Found., 286 So. 2d 439, 442 (La. Ct. App. 1973) (requiring
that the defendant have greater access to the information than the plaintiff to in-
voke the doctrine).
84. See infra notes 88-95 and accompanying text.
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that a defect must be shown affirmatively," and because of the
belief that res ipsa is nothing more than a negligence doctrine."8
California, the state that first ushered in the doctrine of strict
liability,17 does not allow res ipsa loquitur to be used in strict
liability cases. California courts have indicated consistently their
belief that the doctrine has no place in a strict liability claim."
The court opinions rejecting the doctrine are conclusory, howev-
er, and provide no guidance as to the rationale behind the rejec-
tion.89 A federal court struggling with the same problem under
Hawaiian law discussed the California courts' rejection of the
doctrine and concluded that the rejection stemmed from the
stronger procedural effect given res ipsa loquitur under Califor-
nia law. ' °
Under the California Evidence Code, res ipsa loquitur creates
a presumption affecting the burden of production.' If the plain-
tiff proves the doctrinal elements of res ipsa loquitur, then the
factfinder must assume the existence of the presumed fact until
evidence is introduced that would support a finding of its nonex-
istence.92 Thus, a res ipsa showing shifts the burden of produc-
tion over to the defendant to rebut the presumption of negli-
85. See infra notes 96-106 and accompanying text.
86. See infra notes 112-24 and accompanying text.
87. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1962) (establish-
ing strict liability in tort).
88. See Barrett v. Atlas Powder Co., 150 Cal. Rptr. 339, 342 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978)
(rejecting the applicability of the doctrine); Tresham v. Ford Motor Co., 79 Cal. Rptr.
883, 885-87 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969) (holding the same); McCurter v. Norton Co., 69 Cal.
Rptr. 493, 496 (Cal. Ct. App. 1968) (holding the same).
89. See Barrett, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 342 (stating only that the doctrine is not appli-
cable in any action predicated upon the theory of strict liability) (citation omitted);
McCurter, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 496 (stating that an attempt to rely on res ipsa loquitur
in a strict liability action "would be futile" because a "showing [of] a defect cannot
be satisfied by reliance on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur").
90. See Jenkins v. Whittaker Corp., 785 F.2d 720, 732-33 (9th Cir. 1986) (conclud-
ing that California courts do not allow the doctrine to be invoked in strict liability
settings because res ipsa loquitur in California creates a presumption of negligence
that is too great a burden for the defendant to overcome).
91. CAL. EviD. CODE § 646 (West 1995); see also Newing v. Cheatham, 540 P.2d
33, 42-43 (Cal. 1975) (noting that the presumptive effect of res ipsa loquitur shifts
to the defendant the "obligation to introduce sufficient evidence to sustain a finding"
that the defendant was not negligent).
92. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 604.
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gence s3 If the defendant rebuts the presumption, a jury may
still infer negligence from the facts that gave rise to the pre-
sumption." California gives the doctrine a greater procedural
effect but does not require any special showing by the plaintiff to
qualify for a res ipsa instruction; the plaintiff needs to establish
only the elements of the traditional res ipsa loquitur test.95 Res
ipsa loquitur, as defined in California, is a powerful procedural
device for plaintiffs and one that may not dissipate even upon
the introduction of contrary evidence by the defendant. The
doctrine's procedural implications appear to be behind
California's refusal to allow res ipsa to operate in a strict liabili-
ty setting.
Other states have focused on the role of circumstantial evi-
dence in proving defectiveness to exclude res ipsa from strict
liability claims. The Alabama Supreme Court, in Brooks v. Colo-
nial Chevrolet-Buick, Inc.,9" held that res ipsa is not available
in strict liability claims because a plaintiff must put on some
proof of the product's defectiveness. 7 The court later provided
the rationale for this ruling, stating that under Alabama's
products liability law, "a defect in the product must be affirma-
tively shown."98 Procedural concerns did not appear to animate
either decision.9" In Alabama, res ipsa loquitur allows, but does
not require, a jury to infer negligence.' 0 The doctrine, as fol-
93. See id. § 646 cmt., at 198; see also id. §§ 660-670 (outlining other presump-
tions that shift the full burden of proof).
94. See id. § 646(c)(1).
95. A plaintiff in California must establish three elements to use res ipsa loquitur:
First, that it is the kind of [accident or injury] which ordinarily does
not occur in the absence of someone's negligence;
Second, that it was caused by an agency or instrumentality in the ex-
clusive control of the defendant [originally, and which was not mishan-
dled or otherwise changed after the defendant relinquished control]; and
Third, that the [accident or injury] was not due to any voluntary action
or contribution on the part of the plaintiff which was the responsible
cause of his injury.
Id. § 646 cmt., at 198 (alterations in original).
96. 579 So. 2d 1328 (Ala. 1991).
97. See id. at 1333.
98. Townsend v. General Motors Corp., 642 So. 2d 411, 415 (Ala. 1994).
99. See id. at 415; Brooks, 579 So. 2d at 1333.
100. See Holmes v. Birmingham Transit Co., 116 So. 2d 912, 919 (Ala. 1959) (using
both "presumption" and "inference" but meaning inference because the court conclud-
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lowed in Alabama courts, does not shift the burden of proof to
the defendant but merely the burden of going forward with the
evidence.'' The only similarity between Alabama's and
California's applications of res ipsa is that both states use the
traditional res ipsa loquitur test.'
The Tennessee Supreme Court has followed the Alabama Su-
preme Court's evidentiary logic in determining that res ipsa lo-
quitur does not apply in strict products liability settings. In
Browder v. Pettigrew,' the court held that "the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur is not a substitute for proof of defect."" 4 The
court's analysis indicated that the doctrine could be used only in
product liability actions brought under a negligence theory.0 5
Tennessee courts have relied on additional theories to limit the
use of the doctrine. An appellate court recently held that the
doctrine also cannot be applied to warranty-based product liabil-
ity actions.'
Tennessee's procedural approach also mirrors that of Ala-
bama. Res ipsa loquitur allows a Tennessee jury to infer negli-
gence but does not compel such an inference.' 7 To prevail in
the suit, the defendant must rebut the inference, but the defen-
dant is not required to put forth any evidence in order to do
so.' Tennessee and Alabama differ only over the appropriate
test for res ipsa loquitur. Alabama applies the traditional defini-
ed that negligence remained an issue of fact for the jury).
101. See Greyhound Corp. v. Brown, 113 So. 2d 916, 919 (Ala. 1959); see generally
2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 38, § 338, at 435-36 (outlining what most
courts mean when they say that a party has the burden of going forward with the
evidence).
102. See, e.g., Khirieh v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 594 So. 2d 1220, 1223
(Ala. 1992) (applying the traditional test, focusing on an accident that would not
occur normally absent negligence, the defendant's exclusive control, and the plaintiffs
blameless conduct).
103. 541 S.W.2d 402 (Tenn. 1976).
104. Id. at 404; see also Fulton v. Pfizer Hosp. Prods. Group, Inc., 872 S.W.2d 908,
912 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993) (following the Browder precedent).
105. See Browder, 541 S.W.2d at 404 (quoting Mosier v. American Motors Corp.,
303 F. Supp. 44 (S.D. Tex. 1967), afld, 414 F.2d 34 (5th Cir. 1969)).
106. See Fulton, 872 S.W.2d at 912.
107. See Sullivan v. Crabtree, 258 S.W.2d 782, 784 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1953).
108. See Kidd v. Dunn, 499 S.W.2d 898, 900 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1973) (quoting Swee-
ney v. Erving, 228 U.S. 233, 240 (1913), for the proposition that the defendant is
not compelled to produce rebuttal evidence).
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tion,' but Tennessee courts have applied both the Re-
statement version and the traditional version.11 ° Regardless of
the definition employed by Tennessee, both states reject the use
of res ipsa loquitur on the grounds that evidence of defectiveness
must be established affirmatively.11'
The procedural effect of res ipsa loquitur and the role of cir-
cumstantial evidence in proving defectiveness are not the only
grounds upon which states limit res ipsa to negligence claims. In
Brothers v. General Motors Corp.,"2 the Montana Supreme
Court concluded that res ipsa loquitur should be reserved only
for human conduct and should not be applied to defective prod-
ucts."' The court recognized that defects could be proven cir-
cumstantially but declined to allow res ipsa loquitur to be used
to infer defect."4 Procedural effect did not appear to guide the
court's determination."5 Montana follows the procedural ap-
proach favored by a majority of states... and by the other
states that have rejected the use of res ipsa in product liability
actions, except California."7 In Montana, res ipsa allows a jury
to infer negligence,"' but a plaintiffs successful application of
the doctrine appears to shift only the burden of going forward
with evidence."'
Confusion exists in Montana over which res ipsa loquitur test
109. See Khirieh v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 594 So. 2d 1220, 1223 (Ala. 1992).
110. Compare Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Professional Cleaning Serv.,
Inc., 396 S.W.2d 351, 355 (Tenn. 1965) (discussing favorably the Restatement defini-
tion of res ipsa loquitur), with Armes v. Hulett, 843 S.W.2d 427, 432-33 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1992) (stating that the object must have been under the management of the
defendant and the accident must have been the type that does not occur if proper
care is used).
111. See Townsend v. General Motors Corp., 642 So. 2d 411, 415 (Ala. 1994);
Browder v. Pettigrew, 541 S.W.2d 402, 404 (Tenn. 1976).
112. 658 P.2d 1108 (Mont. 1983).
113. See id. at 1110; see also Eisenmenger v. Ethicon, 871 P.2d 1313, 1317 (Mont.
1994) (reaffirming the inapplicability of res ipsa loquitur in a strict liability setting).
114. See Brothers, 658 P.2d at 1109.
115. See id. (containing no discussion of the procedural effect).
116. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
117. See supra text accompanying notes 87-111; infra text accompanying notes 122-36.
118. See Brothers, 658 P.2d at 1110.
119. See Baker v. Rental Serv. Co., 432 P.2d 624, 628 (Mont. 1967) (stating
without implying an absolute duty that the defendant has the "burden of rebutting.
the inference or presumption of negligence").
1997] 1215
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:1197
the state favors. In Brothers, the Supreme Court of Montana
supported the test outlined in the Restatement.12 A more re-
cent case, however, emphasized the need to prove that the de-
fendant exercised exclusive control, a key element of the tradi-
tional test.12' Regardless of the test employed, Montana's deci-
sion to disallow the use of res ipsa loquitur does not appear to
hinge on which test is used or on the doctrine's procedural sig-
nificance, but rather on a view that res ipsa loquitur is solely a
circumstantial theory of negligence.
The belief that res ipsa is a creature of negligence was implic-
it in the Ohio Supreme Court's rejection of the use of res ipsa lo-
quitur in strict products liability actions. In State Auto Mutual
Insurance Co. v. Chrysler Corp.,'22 the court held that the doc-
trine could be used to allow a jury to infer negligence only after
the plaintiff had satisfied his burden of proof under strict
liability." The court refused to expand the scope of the doc-
trine beyond the negligence realm." No unique procedural
grounds exist in Ohio to explain the rejection of the doctrine.
Res ipsa loquitur receives the same judicial treatment as in Ala-
bama, Tennessee, and Montana in that it creates an inference of
negligence" but does not shift the burden of production to the
defendant. 126 Ohio uses the traditional test for res ipsa,'27 so
120. See Brothers, 658 P.2d at 1110 (quoting Tompkins v. Northwestern Union
Trust Co., 645 P.2d 402, 406 (Mont. 1982)).
121. See Contreras v. Vannoy Heating & Air Conditioning, Inc., 892 P.2d 557, 563
(Mont. 1995) (stating that the doctrine requires exclusive control of the instrumentality).
122. 304 N.E.2d 891 (Ohio 1973).
123. See id. at 894-95 (concluding that, before a plaintiff can use res ipsa loquitur
to establish an inference of negligence, a plaintiff in a strict liability action first
must prove that a defect existed in the product, that it existed at the time the
product left the defendant, and that the defeet was the proximate cause of the
plaintiffs injuries).
124. See id.
125. See State Auto, 304 N.E.2d at 894; see also Domany v. Otis Elevator Co., 369
F.2d 604, 612 (6th Cir. 1966) (stating that the doctrine only creates a permissible infer-
ence of negligence); Becker v. Lake County Mem'l Hosp. W., 560 N.E.2d 165, 167 (Ohio
1990) (stating that res ipsa loquitur only permits an inference of negligence).
126. See Domany, 369 F.2d at 612 (stating that the doctrine does not shift the bur-
den to the defendant and that the plaintiff is not entitled to a directed verdict if
the defendant produces no evidence). But see Taxicabs of Cincinnati, Inc. v. Kohler,
165 N.E.2d 244, 245 (Ohio Ct. App. 1959) (holding that if the defendant does not
put forth any evidence to rebut an inference of negligence, then the plaintiff is en-
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the choice of test does not appear to explain the court's decision.
The Ohio Supreme Court appears to have rejected the expansion
of res ipsa loquitur because the court viewed the doctrine as
uniquely negligence-based"s and also because, at least in State
Auto, the court appeared to require more direct proof of defect in
a strict liability setting.
129
Finally, one state appears to have rejected the doctrine's ex-
pansion implicitly based on the belief that res ipsa cannot be used
except in negligence claims. A federal district court, applying
Mississippi law, reached this conclusion in Powe v. Wagner Elec-
tric Sales Corp.30 The court reasoned that, although strict lia-
bility eases the plaintiffs burden by not requiring the plaintiff to
prove negligence to recover, "[strict liability] is certainly not the
equivalent of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur[,] which is a rule of
evidence."' The court did not hold that Mississippi law does
not recognize the cross applicability of the doctrine, but by draw-
ing a distinction between the two doctrines, the court suggested
that res ipsa loquitur should remain a theory of negligence.1 2
Procedurally, Mississippi's handling of res ipsa loquitur is con-
sistent with the majority of states.'33 The doctrine allows the
jury to infer negligence but does not compel such an infer-
ence.' Additionally, the plaintiffs use of the doctrine shifts to
the defendant the burden of going forward with the evidence but
does not require the defendant to rebut the evidence to avoid a
contrary verdict.'35 Mississippi also follows the traditional test
of the doctrine. 6 Although far from completely clear, the Powe
titled to judgment).
127. See Becker, 560 N.E.2d at 167.
128. See State Auto, 304 N.E.2d at 894.
129. See id. at 895 (stating that, in addition to other elements, a plaintiff must
prove that "[tihere was, in fact, a defect in the product . . ").
130. 589 F. Supp. 657 (S.D. Miss. 1984). The Mississippi Supreme Court has not
ruled yet on the cross-applicability of res ipsa loquitur, so the doctrine's standing in
Mississippi remains subject to change.
131. Id. at 661.
132. See id.
133. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
134. See Read v. Southern Pine Elec. Power Ass'n, 515 So. 2d 916, 920 (Miss. 1987).
135. See id.
136. See id. at 919-20 (requiring that the defendant have exclusive control, that the oc-
currence be of the type that would not occur if proper care had been used, and that the
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opinion suggests that Mississippi would follow California,"7
Alabama,1 8  Tennessee,1 9  Montana, 4 ' and Ohio1 in
rejecting the application of res ipsa loquitur to strict products
liability claims. Thus, courts have rejected the expansion of res
ipsa for various reasons: because of procedural concerns, because
of the belief that a defect must be specifically shown, and be-
cause of the belief that res ipsa is, and should be, no more than
a negligence doctrine.
States Recognizing the Cross-Applicability of the Doctrine
Three states have allowed res ipsa to be used in strict prod-
ucts liability claims." In State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance
Co. v. Wrap-On Co.,4 3 a Louisiana appellate court concluded
that, "because [res ipsa loquitur] is an evidentiary doctrine, it
may be applied to any theory of recovery for which it is suit-
able."" The court noted that the Louisiana Supreme Court
had previously applied the doctrine in a products liability action
without naming the doctrine, and later held that "res ipsa loqui-
tur applies to products liability cases." "5
Louisiana, unlike California, has recognized the use of the
doctrine even though the doctrine is given a greater procedural
effect. Some Louisiana opinions speak of the doctrine creating a
permissible inference of negligence,' but the clear weight of
occurrence not be a result of any voluntary action taken by the plaintiff).
137. See supra notes 87-95 and accompanying text.
138. See supra notes 96-102 and accompanying text.
139. See supra notes 103-11 and accompanying text.
140. See supra notes 112-21 and accompanying text.
141. See supra notes 122-29 and accompanying text.
142. See Jenkins v. Whittaker Corp., 785 F.2d 720, 733 (9th Cir. 1986) (applying
Hawaiian law); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Wrap-On Co., 626 So. 2d 874,
876-77 (La. Ct. App. 1993); Rennick v. Fruehauf Corp., 264 N.W.2d 264, 267-68
(Wis. 1978).
143. 626 So. 2d 874 (La. Ct. App. 1993).
144. Id. at 877.
145. Id. (noting the state supreme court's usage-in-fact of res ipsa loquitur to prove
defect in Weber v. Fidelity & Casualty Ins. Co., 250 So. 2d 754, 755-56 (La. 1971),
superseded by LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:2800.51-9:2800.59 (West 1991)). The Louisi-
ana Supreme Court has yet to hold directly that res ipsa loquitur can be used in
strict liability actions.
146. See id.; see also Ray v. Ameri-Care Hesp., 400 So. 2d 1127, 1133 (La. Ct. App.
1218
RES IPSA AND MANUFACTURING DEFECTS
authority in Louisiana indicates that the doctrine, if proved,
shifts the full burden of proof to the defendant to show an ab-
sence of negligence. 47 Thus, res ipsa loquitur has a greater
procedural effect in Louisiana, yet the doctrine is nonetheless al-
lowed in strict liability cases. The only distinction between the
California and Louisiana approaches to this issue, other than
the outcome, is Louisiana's use of the least-favored res ipsa lo-
quitur test. Louisiana courts have employed the traditional defi-
nition but have added an additional requirement to the test:
that the information needed to explain the accident be more
readily available to the defendant than to the plaintiff.'48 As
will be discussed in greater detail later in this Note, the
defendant's superior knowledge, or lack thereof, should play an
important role in the use of res ipsa loquitur in manufacturing
defect claims. 49
Hawaii and Wisconsin have mirrored each other in their re-
spective extensions of res ipsa loquitur to prove product defec-
tiveness. In Jenkins v. Whittaker Corp.,5 a federal court ap-
plying Hawaii law concluded that "nothing bars application of
the res ipsa loquitur theory to strict liability." 5' Similarly, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court, in Rennick v. Fruehauf Corp.," up-
held a trial court's instruction to the jury regarding res ipsa lo-
quitur in a products liability case.'53 The court concluded that
"[t]he existence of the defect may be shown by a res ipsa type of
inference.""
1981) (stating that the doctrine only creates an inference of negligence).
147. See Ray, 400 So. 2d at 1133; see also Wells v. Woman's Hasp. Found., 286 So.
2d 439, 442 (La. Ct. App. 1973); Horton v. Seligman & Latz, Inc., 260 So. 2d 731,
734 (La. Ct. App. 1972); Boudreaux v. American Ins. Co., 245 So. 2d 794, 797 (La.
Ct. App. 1971), affd, 264 So. 2d 621 (La. 1972).
148. See Wells, 286 So. 2d at 441 (stating that "information as to the true cause of
the accident [being) more readily available to the defendant than to the plaintiff" is
one of the elements of res ipsa loquitur in Louisiana); see also Alexander v. St. Paul
Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 312 So. 2d 139, 143 (La. Ct. App. 1975) (noting the superior
knowledge requirement for the application of res ipsa loquitur).
149. See infra notes 286-94 and accompanying text.
150. 785 F.2d 720 (9th Cir. 1986).
151. Id. at 733.
152. 264 N.W.2d 264 (Wis. 1978).
153. See id. at 268.
154. Id. at 267.
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The doctrine has the same procedural effect in both jurisdic-
tions, creating a permissible inference of negligence 5 but not
requiring the defendant to come forward with exculpatory evi-
dence to avoid a contrary jury verdict. 5 ' Both states have also
embraced the traditional definition of res ipsa loquitur l 7 Loui-
siana, Hawaii, and Wisconsin all allow the doctrine to be used in
strict products liability actions, but like the states rejecting the
doctrine, have embraced the doctrine for different reasons.'
States Recognizing the Cross-Applicability of the Inferential Core
of the Doctrine
Two states have recognized that the inferences at the heart of
res ipsa should apply in strict liability claims, although they
have not held explicitly that the doctrine, as now constructed,
should apply.'59 Two other states have crafted inferential doc-
155. See Jenkins, 785 F.2d at 733; Weggeman v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 93 N.W.2d
467, 472 (Wis. 1958).
156. See Jenkins, 785 F.2d at 733 (stating that "a defendant need not come for-
ward with rebuttal evidence to avoid a directed verdict"); American Family Mut. Ins.
Co. v. Dobrzynski, 277 N.W.2d 749, 754 (Wis. 1979) (concluding that the plaintiff is
not entitled to a directed verdict if the defendant does not put on any evidence un-
less the inference is so powerful that it is inescapable). But see Guanzon v.
Kalamau, 402 P.2d 289, 291, 293 (Haw. 1965) (treating the doctrine as a presump-
tion that truly shifts the burden of production).
157. See Agee v. Kahului Trucking & Storage, Inc., 688 P.2d 256, 258 (Haw. 1984)
(requiring that the defendant have control and management of the instrument);
Turner v. Willis, 582 P.2d 710, 714 (Haw. 1978) (requiring that the instrument be
under control of the defendant and that the accident be one that does not normally
happen if due care is exercised); Dobrzynski, 277 N.W.2d at 752-53 (stating that a
plaintiff must show that the accident does not occur normally without negligence,
that the accident was caused by an instrument within the "exclusive control" of the
defendant, and that the plaintiff did not voluntarily contribute to the accident).
158. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Jenkins discussed the policy rationale
behind California's rejection of the doctrine and concluded that the doctrine would be
allowed in Hawaii based on the procedural distinctions between res ipsa loquitur in
Hawaii and in California. See Jenkins, 785 F.2d at 732-33. The Louisiana appellate
court summarily allowed the use of the doctrine because the court viewed res ipsa
as a rule of evidence, see State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Wrap-On Co., 626 So.
2d 874, 878 (La. Ct. App. 1993), and the Wisconsin Supreme Court allowed the doc-
trine to be used because the inferential base of the doctrine allowed cross-applica-
tion. See Rennick v. Fruehauf Corp., 264 N.W.2d 264, 267 (Wis. 1978).
159. See Williams v. Smart Chevrolet Co., 730 S.W.2d 479, 482-83 (Ark. 1987);
Lang v. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 287 S.E.2d 729, 731 (Ga. Ct. App. 1982).
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trines for product defect cases that mimic res ipsa loquitur."6 '
Arkansas and Georgia courts have noted the inferential applica-
bility of res ipsa loquitur to strict products liability actions. The
Arkansas Supreme Court, in Williams v. Smart Chevrolet
Co.,.6 relied on Dean Prosser's statement that "[sltrictly
speaking, since proof of negligence is not in issue, res ipsa loqui-
tur has no application to strict liability; but the inferences which
are the core of the doctrine remain, and are not less applica-
ble."162 In Lang v. Federated Department Stores, Inc.," a
Georgia appellate court used almost identical language in reach-
ing the same conclusion."' Neither court explicitly held that a
res ipsa loquitur instruction would be proper in a strict liability
setting." In Williams, however, the Arkansas Supreme Court
stated that "[t]he plaintiff is not required to prove a specific
defect when common experience tells us that the accident would
not have occurred in the absence of a defect."" The Georgia
appellate court was less sweeping but noted that the injury was
of such a nature that the only reasonable explanation was that
the product was defective and that "a jury may be permitted to
infer that the product was defective."" 7 Although not clearly
ruling on the applicability of the doctrine, both courts, in stating
that res ipsa-like inferences may be allowed to prove defect,
referenced the core elements of res ipsa loquitur. The language
of the opinions indicates that courts in both states would allow a
160. See Cassisi v. Maytag Co., 396 So. 2d 1140, 1148-52 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981);
Delvecchio v. General Motors Corp., 625 N.E.2d 1022, 1027-28 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993).
161. 730 S.W.2d 479 (Ark. 1987).
162. Id. at 482 (quoting Southern Co. v. Graham, 607 S.W.2d 677, 679 (Ark. 1980)
(quoting PROSSER, supra note 68, § 103, at 672-73)).
163. 287 S.E.2d 729 (Ga. Ct. App. 1982).
164. See id. at 731 ("Generally, as proof of negligence is not in issue in a strict
liability case, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur has no application. Yet, the inferences
which are the core of the doctrine are more and are no less applicable .... "). The
Georgia Supreme Court has not yet ruled on this issue.
165. In both Arkansas and Georgia, the court opinions merely referred to the
doctrine's inferential utility. See Williams, 730 S.W.2d at 482; Lang, 287 S.E.2d at
731. The Wisconsin Supreme Court went one step further, affirming a trial court's
use of a res ipsa jury instruction in a strict liability case. See Rennick v. Fruehauf
Corp., 264 N.W.2d 264, 267 (Wis. 1978).
166. Williams, 730 S.W.2d at 482 (citing Harrell Motors, Inc. v. Flanery, 612
S.W.2d 727, 729 (Ark. 1981)).
167. Lang, 287 S.E.2d at 731.
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plaintiff to prove the elements of res ipsa loquitur in order to
generate an inference of defect. These rulings stand in stark
contrast to the opinions of the Alabama and Tennessee courts
regarding the level of proof necessary to show defectiveness."'
Arkansas and Georgia employ the traditional test of res ipsa
loquitur.'69 Procedurally, however, the states differ. Georgia
follows the majority view regarding the procedural implications
of the doctrine. 70 The doctrine allows only an inference of neg-
ligence,' and only the burden of going forward with the evi-
dence shifts to the defendant.' The procedural effect of the
Arkansas doctrine is less clear. Court opinions have used both
the terms "inference" and "presumption" inconsistently, 7 ' and
burden of proof issues remain unsettled as well. Earlier opinions
seemed to establish that only the burden of going forward with
the evidence shifted to the defendant, 74 but a recent Arkansas
Supreme Court opinion has cast doubt on this conclusion.'75
168. See Brooks v. Colonial Chevrolet-Buick, Inc., 579 So. 2d 1328, 1333 (Ala. 1991)
(holding that defects must be affirmatively proven); Browder v. Pettigrew, 541
S.W.2d 402, 404 (Tenn. 1976).
169. See Schmidt v. Gibbs, 807 S.W.2d 928, 931 (Ark. 1991) (stating that the plain-
tiff must show that the defendant owed a duty of care, that the instrument was
under the control of the defendant, that the accident was one that would not have
occurred normally if proper care had been used, and that no contrary evidence ex-
ists); Hall v. Chastain, 273 S.E.2d 12, 14 (Ga. 1980) (stating as the elements of res
ipsa that the defendant must own or control the "thing doing the damage [and that]
the accident [be] of a kind which, in the absence of proof of some external cause,
[would] not ordinarily happen without negligence.") (quoting Chenall v. Palmer Brick
Co., 43 S.E. 443 (Ga. 1903)).
170. See supra notes 116-19.
171. See Bowers v. Fred W. Amend Co., 35 S.E.2d 15, 16 (Ga. Ct. App. 1945).
172. See Parker v. Dailey, 177 S.E.2d 44, 46 (Ga. 1970).
173. Compare Heard v. Arkansas Power & Light Co., 147 S.W.2d 362, 364 (Ark. 1941)
(stating that the doctrine creates a presumption of negligence), with Coca-Cola Bottling
Co. v. Mattice, 243 S.W.2d 15, 18 (Ark. 1951) (using the terms "inference" and "pre-
sumption" interchangeably in discussing the procedural effect of the doctrine).
174. See Mattice, 243 S.W.2d at 18.
175. In Schmidt v. Gibbs, 807 S.W.2d 928 (Ark. 1991), the Arkansas Supreme Court
stated that the doctrine "shifts to the defendant the burden of proving that it was not
caused through any lack of care on its part." Id. at 931 (quoting Southwestern Tel. &
Tel. Co. v. Bruce, 117 S.W. 564, 567 (Ark. 1909)). The court's reliance on its 1909
opinion is questionable given its extensive discussion of the procedural effect of the
doctrine in Mattice, 243 S.W.2d at 17-21, and its subsequent conclusion that Arkansas
had abandoned the English rule in favor of the rule that the doctrine only shifts the
burden of going forward with the evidence. See id. at 19-21.
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Regardless of whether Arkansas courts decide to give the doc-
trine a greater procedural effect, courts in Arkansas and Georgia
have recognized that the inferential utility of res ipsa loquitur
extends beyond negligence cases.
Florida and Illinois have not allowed the use of res ipsa loqui-
tur in strict products liability cases but have recognized the use
of closely analogous doctrines. In Cassisi v. Maytag Co.,176 a
Florida appellate court approved of and applied the inference of
defect rule fashioned in Greco v. Bucciconi Engineering Co.17
The Greco doctrine "states that when a product malfunctions
during normal operation, a legal inference... arises, and the
injured plaintiff thereby establishes a prima facie case for jury
consideration."" The court recognized that this inferential
rule is "somewhat analogous" to res ipsa loquitur and that both
inferential rules were "based upon common sense assumptions
that the occurrence of the accident is such that in the ordinary
course of events it could not have happened... without the neg-
ligence of the person in control... and... without the product's
defective condition." 9 The court noted that the two doctrines
were guided by the same public policy rationale of aiding a
plaintiff when direct proof is unavailable. 8 ' The Florida court
apparently embraced the Greco inference instead of the res ipsa
doctrine because the court concluded that exclusive control, the
central factor of the traditional res ipsa test, is an indispensable
element of res ipsa."8'
An Illinois appellate court recently issued a ruling similar to
Cassisi, concluding that a cause of action for strict liability could
be "premised on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur."'82 The court
noted that, under Illinois law, the doctrine was not technically
available in products liability cases but that Illinois courts nev-
ertheless had recognized a "semi-res-ipsa-loquitur theory.""s
176. 396 So. 2d 1140, 1148 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
177. 283 F. Supp. 978 (WD. Pa. 1967), affld, 407 F.2d 87 (3d Cir. 1969).
178. Cassisi, 396 So. 2d at 1148.
179. Id. at 1149.
180. See id.
181. See id. at 1151-52.
182. Delvecchio v. General Motors Corp., 625 N.E.2d 1022, 1025 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993).
183. Id. at 1026 (citing Samansky v. Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke's Med. Ctr., 567
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The court justified its determination on the grounds that res ipsa
was a rule of evidence and not a doctrine of substantive law.M
Procedurally, Florida and Illinois follow the majority approach
regarding res ipsa.185 The doctrine makes possible an inference
of negligence but does not compel it, 8' and res ipsa shifts the
burden of going forward with the evidence but does not compel
the defendant to introduce evidence to avoid a contrary jury ver-
dict. 87 The Florida court recognized the inferential value of res
ipsa loquitur in proving defect but, because the court relied on the
traditional test of res ipsa loquitur requiring exclusive con-
trol," the court adhered to a doctrinal cousin of res ipsa in-
stead.'89 Perhaps if the court had embraced the modern, relaxed
view of the control element of res ipsa loquitur, the rationale re-
lied on by the court for the nonapplication of the res ipsa doctrine
would disappear and, as a result, nothing would bar the applica-
tion of res ipsa to prove product defect."9 Such a result is not a
foregone conclusion, however. The Illinois court embraced a more
relaxed version of the test 9 but still concluded that the doctrine
N.E.2d 386, 394 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990)).
184. See id. at 1027.
185. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
186. See Cassisi, 396 So. 2d at 1149; Delvecchio, 625 N.E.2d at 1027; see also An-
derson v. Sarasota County Pub. Hosp. Bd., 214 So. 2d 655, 657 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1968) (stating that the doctrine only created an inference).
187. See Cassisi, 396 So. 2d at 1151 (quoting PROSSER, supra note 68, § 40, at
229); Imig v. Beck, 503 N.E.2d 324, 329 (Ill. 1986); see also Stanek v. Houston, 165
So. 2d 825, 828 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1964) (implying that the defendant is not re-
quired to put forth explanatory evidence to avoid a directed verdict for the plaintiff).
188. See Cassisi, 396 So. 2d at 1151-52 (focusing on the control element in res ipsa).
189. See id.
190. The drafters of the Restatement definition of res ipsa loquitur removed the
"exclusive control" requirement, believing that such a rigid control test is not needed
as long as the plaintiff can show that it was more likely than not the defendant
who caused the problem. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328D cmt. e
(1965); see also KEETON ET AL., supra note 37, § 39 (discussing control as a mere
tool for determining whether it was more likely than not the defendant who was
negligent); Louis L. Jaffe, Res Ipsa Loquitur Vindicated, 1 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 6 n.13
(1951) (advocating for less focus on control).
191. See Delvecchio, 625 N.E.2d at 1026-27 (outlining the traditional test but then
noting that the Illinois Supreme Court, in Lynch v. Precision Mach. Shop, Ltd., 443
N.E.2d 569, 572-74 (Ill. 1983), embraced a flexible control requirement more akin to
the Restatement test).
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was not technically available in strict liability claims.19 2
States Recognizing That Common Experience May Allow the
Inference of a Defect
Two states, Kentucky and Missouri, appear close to allowing
the use of res ipsa loquitur in a strict liability setting. Appellate
courts in both states have recognized that common experience
indicates that certain accidents do not occur absent some defect.
Therefore, the courts allowed an inference of defect to arise un-
der those circumstances.'93 In recognizing "common experience"
inferences, these courts have recognized the principle behind res
ipsa loquitur without invoking the formal doctrine. The purpose
of the different res ipsa loquitur tests is to determine whether
the accident was the type of accident that ordinarily does not
occur absent some negligence." The specific elements of each
test strive to tie the cause of the accident to the defendant.'95
Both Kentucky and Missouri follow the majority view of the
procedural effect of the doctrine and only differ slightly on the
proper test,'96 so court refusal to extend the doctrine would
likely not rest on procedural reasons. In both states, res ipsa
loquitur generates a permissible inference of negligence9 7 and
shifts to the defendant the burden of going forward with the evi-
192. See id. at 1026.
193. See Embs v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., 528 S.W.2d 703, 706 (Ky. 1975) (holding
that 'Itihere are some accidents ... as to which there is common experience that
they do not ordinarily occur without a defect; and this permits the inference of a
defect") (citing PROSSER, supra note 68, § 103, at 673); Crump v. McNaught P.T.Y.
Ltd., 743 S.W.2d 532, 535 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (stating that "if common experience
suggests an event would not occur absent a defect, then a defect can be inferred").
Neither the Supreme Court of Kentucky nor the Supreme Court of Missouri has dis-
cussed this issue.
194. See supra notes 32-36 and accompanying text.
195. The traditional test requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that the defendant
had exclusive control over the accident-causing instrumentality in order to make it
more likely that the defendan~s conduct caused the harm. See supra note 32 and
accompanying text. The Restatement test requires the plaintiff to exclude other pos-
sible causes of the injury in order to make it more probable that the defendant's
conduct caused the harm. See supra note 33.
196. See Bell & Koch, Inc. v. Stanley, 375 S.W.2d 696, 697 (Ky. 1964);
Cunningham v. Hayes, 463 S.W.2d 555, 564 (Mo. Ct. App. 1971).
197. See Bell & Koch, 375 S.W.2d at 697; Cunningham, 463 S.W.2d at 564.
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dence.' 9' The states differ on the exact version of the res ipsa
test they employ; Kentucky continues to apply the traditional
test of res ipsa loquitur, 9 9 but Missouri has followed Louisiana
in requiring the defendant to possess superior knowledge as to
the cause of the accident before the doctrine can be invoked. °0
The knowledge requirement, which places a greater initial bur-
den on the plaintiff, may signal that the Missouri Supreme
Court would be even more likely to allow res ipsa loquitur to be
used to prove defect because the defendant could counter the
inference with superior knowledge. The final section of this Note
examines the ramifications of the superior knowledge require-
ment as it relates to the doctrine's applicability in proving man-
ufacturing defects.
Washington has joined Kentucky and Missouri in recognizing
the "common experience" inference of defect. In Bombardi v.
Pochel's Appliance & TV Co.,201 a Washington appellate court
noted that "there are some accidents as to which there is common
experience dictating that they do not ordinarily occur without a
defect, and as to which the inference that a product is defective
should be permitted."2 2 Washington courts have employed the
traditional test of res ipsa loquitur,"° following Kentucky,0 4
Missouri, 25 and a majority of the other states in stating that
res ipsa loquitur only allows an inference of negligence." 6
198. See Dunning v. Kentucky Utils. Co., 109 S.W.2d 6, 9 (Ky. 1937) (noting that
the burden never shifts to the defendant but that if he does not put on evidence he
may lose the case); Turner v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R. Co., 142 S.W.2d 455, 460
(Mo. 1940).
199. See Sadr v. Hager Beauty Sch., Inc., 723 S.W.2d 886, 887 (Ky. Ct. App. 1987)
(requiring the plaintiff to show that the defendant had full control, that an accident
would not occur normally without negligence, and that the injuries were caused by
the accident).
200. See Bass v. Nooney Co., 646 S.W.2d 765, 768 (Mo. 1983) (en banc) (listing the
elements as an occurrence that does not occur normally if due care is used,
defendant's control of the instrumentality, and defendant's possession of superior
knowledge).
201. 518 P.2d 202 (Wash. Ct. App. 1973).
202. Id. at 204. The Washington Supreme Court has not ruled on this issue.
203. See Miller v. Kennedy, 588 P.2d 734, 737 (Wash. 1978) (en banc) (listing the
two requirements as control of the instrument by the defendant and a type of injury
that does not occur normally absent negligence by the defendant).
204. See supra notes 193-96 and accompanying text.
205. See supra notes 193-96 and accompanying text.
206. See Miller, 588 P.2d at 737; accord Tuengel v. Stobbs, 367 P.2d 1008, 1009
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The further procedural effect of the doctrine appears unsettled
in Washington. A recent appellate court decision stated that,
once the doctrine applies, "the defendant has the duty to come
forward with exculpatory evidence."2 7 Such language suggests
that the defendant may have the burden of production, and thus
be required to put forth sufficient evidence or lose. An earlier
Washington Supreme Court decision did little to resolve the is-
sue,20 8 stating that, once the plaintiff has established res ipsa
loquitur, "the burden then devolves upon defendant to furnish
an explanation or rebuttal of that presumption of negli-
gence."0 9 Covey did not answer the question of whether the
defendant has a legal duty to explain away the inference or just
a practical duty to come forward with rebuttal evidence. If
Washington courts conclude that res ipsa requires the defendant
to either provide exculpatory evidence or lose, similar to the ap-
proach in Louisiana and California, then the decision as to
whether res ipsa loquitur should be extended into the field of
strict liability may rest upon a determination of which state
model to follow: Louisiana or California.
Maryland courts have shown a slight recognition of the con-
ceptual framework necessary to allow expansion of res ipsa lo-
quitur into the strict products liability field. In Harrison v. Bill
Cairns Pontiac,210 the Maryland Court of Special Appeals noted
that if circumstantial evidence rules out other causes, "[ain in-
ference of a defect may be drawn from the happening of an acci-
dent."2" The court articulated a five-factor test for when a de-
fect could be inferred, including a requirement that the accident
not be of the type that happens without a defect.212 This prong
(Wash. 1962); supra note 40 and accompanying text.
207. Murphy v. Montgomery Elevator Co., 828 P.2d 584, 585 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992)
(emphasis added).
208. See Covey v. Western Tank Lines, Inc., 218 P.2d 322 (Wash. 1950).
209. Id. at 328.
210. 549 A.2d 385 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1988).
211. Id. at 390. The Maryland Court of Appeals, the court of last resort in Mary-
land, has not yet ruled on this issue.
212. See Harrison, 549 A.2d at 390 (listing the factors to be considered as "(1) expert
testimony as to possible causes; (2) the occurrence of the accident a short time after
the sale; (3) same accidents in similar products; (4) the elimination of other causes of
the accident; (5) the type of accident that does not happen without a defect") (quoting
1997] 1227
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:1197
is consistent with the rationale behind res ipsa loquitur,213 and
the other factors stated by the court all tend, as do the factors in
the res ipsa loquitur tests, to isolate the defendant as the likely
cause of the defect or negligence. Maryland's endorsement of a
product defect test, although not res ipsa loquitur, is similar to
the inferential test adopted in Florida214 and thus embraces
the core of the res ipsa doctrine in strict liability actions without
embracing the doctrine as a whole.
Maryland courts have adopted the majority approach to res
ipsa,215 allowing an inference of negligence by the jury.216 The
burden shifts to the defendant to go forward with the evidence,
but the defendant has no legal duty to come forward with excul-
patory evidence.217 Maryland also follows the majority of states
in recognizing the traditional test for res ipsa loquitur.2" No
heightened procedural effect exists to give Maryland courts
pause in extending the doctrine into strict liability settings, and
Maryland courts already allow circumstantial evidence to prove
defect under a similar inferential test.29 If the Maryland
courts recognize the similarity between their stated defect doc-
trine and res ipsa loquitur, the courts might recognize the utility
of allowing res ipsa loquitur to act as the single test to infer
negligence and to infer certain types of strict products liability
defects.
No consensus has emerged as to whether res ipsa should be
allowed in strict liability claims, nor has a consistent approach
to the issue arisen in the courts. Courts that have rejected the
doctrine have focused on its procedural effect, 220 the degree of
Cornell Drilling Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 359 A.2d 822, 827 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1976)); see
also PROSSER, supra note 68, § 103, at 671-76 (discussing similar factors).
213. See PROSSER, supra note 68, § 103, at 673-74.
214. Cassisi v. Maytag Co., 396 So. 2d 1140, 1148-52 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981)
(adopting an inference of defect test from Pennsylvania).
215. See supra notes 40-41.
216. See Meda v. Brown, 569 A.2d 202, 204-05 (Md. 1990).
217. See id. at 205.
218. See id. at 204 (requiring that the defendant have exclusive control, that the
accident be the type that does not occur normally absent negligence, and that the
plaintiff not aid in the causation of the accident).
219. See Harrison v. Bill Cairns Pontiac, 549 A.2d 385, 390 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1988).
220. See Tresham v. Ford Motor Co., 79 Cal. Rptr. 883, 885-86 (Cal. Ct. App.
1969); see also Jenkins v. Whittaker Corp., 785 F.2d 720, 732-33 (9th Cir. 1986)
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proof of defectiveness necessary in strict liability claims,"' and
the nature of the doctrine.2  States that have embraced the
expansion of res ipsa into strict liability have focused on the
inferential utility of the doctrine21 or the belief that res ipsa is
only an evidentiary tool.' Still other states have appeared
willing to accept an expanded role for res ipsa based on a judi-
cial view of the utility of circumstantial evidence in proving
product defects. 21
CRITICISMS OF STATE APPROACHES TO THE ISSUE
Policy Rationales for the Imposition of Strict Products Liability
This section outlines the basic policy justifications for strict
liability and then uses these justifications as a framework to
criticize current state approaches to the cross-applicability of res
ipsa loquitur.
Many scholars have analyzed the doctrinal justifications of
strict products liability. One of the earliest and most adamant
advocates of strict liability was Fleming James.22 6 He endorsed
strict products liability as the best approach to solving the prob-
(concluding that California rejects the use of res ipsa loquitur given the greater pro-
cedural effect of the doctrine in California).
221. See, e.g., Brooks v. Colonial Chevrolet-Buick, 579 So. 2d 1328, 1333 (Ala. 1991)
(holding that, in the strict liability setting, res ipsa loquitur is not applicable be-
cause a plaintiff must put forth some evidence that the product was defective).
222. See Brothers v. General Motors Corp., 658 P.2d 1108, 1110 (Mont. 1983) (stat-
ing that res ipsa is generally reserved only for human conduct).
223. See, e.g., Rennick v. Fruehauf Corp., 264 N.W.2d 264, 267 (Wis. 1978) (holding
that defectiveness may be shown through "res ipsa type" inferences).
224. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. v. Wrap-On Co, 626 So. 2d 874, 877 (La. Ct.
App. 1993) (holding that res ipsa is an evidentiary doctrine and thus can be applied
to any theory of recovery for which it is suitable).
225. See, e.g., Lang v. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 287 S.E.2d 729, 731 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1982) (noting the inferential utility of the doctrine).
226. See Fleming James, Jr., Products Liability, 34 TEX. L. REV. 44 (1955) (advocat-
ing strict liability in tort law for product injuries). One historian of the strict liabili-
ty movement has argued that James actually advocated strict liability only as a
starting point in the movement toward absolute liability on manufacturers for prod-
uct failures. See George L. Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical
History of the Intellectual Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 461,
.527 (1985) (tracing the history of the intellectual forces that brought forth the mod-
em idea of strict products liability)..
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lem of accidents.227 James and other commentators have set
forth several rationales for the imposition of strict liability.
First, such commentators espoused a rationale based on the
manufacturer's superior access to information and modern con-
sumer reliance on the knowledge and dependability of the manu-
facturer.22 Second, and similarly, plaintiffs have a difficult
time proving negligence in most product accident cases."
Third, through insurance and by passing along added costs to
consumers in the form of higher prices, manufacturers can
spread the risk better than can consumers."' Fourth, strict lia-
bility is an economically efficient legal structure that promotes
the allocation of losses to the party most able to avoid the
costs."' Fifth, the imposition of strict liability is believed to
generate safer products by inducing manufacturers to increase
investment in quality control and other safety measures. 32
227. See James, supra note 226, at 227.
228. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 901 (Cal. 1962) (im-
posing strict liability on the manufacturer); see also Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co.,
150 P.2d 436, 440-44 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., concurring) (outlining the rationale
behind the strict liability system that would be adopted 20 years later in
Greenman).
229. See John W. Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44
Miss. L.J. 825, 826 (1973) (providing a survey of the development of strict product
liability); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. a
(Tentative Draft No. 2, 1995) (outlining why the common rationales for strict liabili-
ty are most appropriate in a manufacturing defect situation); John E. Montgomery &
David G. Owen, Reflections on the Theory and Administration of Strict Tort Liability
for Defective Products, 27 S.C. L. REV. 803, 809 (1976) (outlining the development of
and rationales behind strict liability).
230. See Wade, supra note 229, at 826; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:
PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. a (noting that manufacturers are better able to insure
against product defect losses); Cowan, supra note 74, at 1088 (discussing the policies
driving the imposition of strict liability); cf. Montgomery & Owen, supra note 229, at
809 (noting that sellers can absorb and spread costs better than can buyers).
231. See Guido Calabresi, Optimal Deterrence and Accidents: To Fleming James, Jr.,
84 YALE L.J. 656, 666-68 (1975) (arguing that the appropriate test should be to
determine who is in the best position to reduce accident costs); Guido Calabresi &
Jon T. Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L.J. 1055,
1060 (1972) (arguing the same cheapest-cost-avoider standard); Priest, supra note
226, at 520; see also Montgomery & Owen, supra note 229, at 809 (noting that sell-
ers can better assess risks and "absorb or spread costs of product accidents" than
can consumers).
232. See Montgomery & Owen, supra note 229, at 809-10; Wade, supra note 229, at
826. A government report on products liability concluded that the imposition of strict
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Criticisms of States Rejecting the Use of the Doctrine in Strict
Liability
California ushered in the era of strict products liability, yet its
lawmakers have rejected unequivocally the extension of res ipsa
loquitur into the field of strict liability.' The apparent reason
is the heightened procedural effect given res ipsa loquitur in
California.' Justice Traynor's policy rationale for strict liabili-
ty in Greenman and Escola, however, favors the use of res ipsa
loquitur in strict liability actions. 5 Traynor justified strict lia-
bility on the ground that producers who put their products on
the market knowing consumers will not inspect them should be
held liable for any defects, regardless of fault. 6 The decision
by California courts not to allow the extension of res ipsa loqui-
tur to prove defects effectively limits the strictness of strict lia-
bility in California. Res ipsa loquitur, like strict liability, aids
plaintiffs in establishing their cases. 7 Keeping res ipsa and
strict liability separate means that certain plaintiffs will not be
able to state a cause of action or get their case heard by a jury
due to the nature of the defect.
California classifies res ipsa loquitur as a presumption affect-
ing the burden of production but not the burden of persuasion,
yet California also recognizes a variety of presumptions that do
liability had induced manufacturers to devote more time and resources toward pre-
venting product liability. See U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE
ON PRODUCT LABILITY, FINAL REPORT VI-47 (1977) [hereinafter COMMERCE REPORT].
For articles analyzing the theoretical and philosophical bases of strict liability, see
Jules L. Coleman, The Morality of Strict Tort Liability, 18 WM. & MARY L. REV. 259
(1976); Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151
(1973); George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV.
537 (1972); Francis E. Lucey, Liability Without Fault and the Natural Law, 24
TENN. L. REV. 952 (1957).
233. See, e.g., Barrett v. Atlas Powder Co., 150 Cal. Rptr. 339, 342 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978).
234. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 604 (West 1995); see also supra notes 91-94 and ac-
companying text (discussing the procedural effect of res ipsa loquitur in California).
235. See generally Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 901 (Cal.
1962) (imposing strict liability on the manufacturer); Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling
Co., 150 P.2d 436, 440-44 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., concurring) (outlining the ratio-
nale behind strict liability).
236. See Escola, 150 P.2d at 440-44 (Traynor, J., concurring).
237. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. a (Tentative
Draft No. 2, 1995) (noting the similarity between res ipsa loquitur and strict liability).
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affect the burden of persuasion." Presumptions are estab-
lished for a variety of reasons. Probability, superior access to in-
formation, and social policy are three common rationales for the
judicial or statutory creation of a presumption.23 9 Some com-
mentators on the law of evidence have argued that the greater
the social policy promoting the creation of the presumption, the
more procedural weight such a presumption should be given.24
California recognizes this belief, at least implicitly, through its
bifurcated evidence code.24 The code's drafters, however, de-
clined to give res ipsa loquitur the highest procedural signifi-
cance. 2 Given the strong social policy goal of accident
avoidance inherent in the strict liability system, res ipsa loqui-
tur should be viewed as a presumption that at a minimum shifts
the burden of production on the issue to the manufacturer and
at times shifts the burden of persuasion as well, at least when
the doctrine is applied in manufacturing defect cases. 4"
Alabama and Tennessee have both rejected the extension of
res ipsa loquitur into the strict products liability field based on
the belief that, in order to impose liability, defects must be
shown affirmatively or specifically.' These decisions make
strict products liability in Alabama and Tennessee less strict
than it is in other states.245 The requirement of affirmative or
specific proof of defectiveness necessarily will bar certain plain-
238. See CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 600-669 (splitting presumptions into types that shift
only the burden of production and those that also shift the ultimate burden of proof).
239. See MICHAEL M. MARTIN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE § 3.02 (6th ed. 1988)
(discussing the bases for the creation of evidentiary presumptions); 2 MCCORMICK ON
EVIDENCE, supra note 38, § 343, at 580.
240. See Edmund M. Morgan, Instructing the Jury upon Presumptions and Burden
of Proof, 47 HARV. L. REV. 59, 81-82 (1933) (arguing that presumptions created for
social policy reasons should receive greater procedural effect); see also Francis H.
Bohlen, The Effect of Rebuttable Presumptions of Law upon the Burden of Proof, 68
U. PA. L. REV. 307, 313 (1920) (arguing that the effect to be given each presumption
should depend upon the purpose underlying the presumption).
241. See CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 600-669.
242. See supra notes 91 and 93 and accompanying text.
243. This proposal is discussed fully in the final section of this Note. See infra note
332 and accompanying text.
244. See Townsend v. General Motors Corp., 642 So. 2d 411, 415 (Ala. 1994); Fulton
v. Pfizer Hosp. Prods. Group, Inc., 872 S.W.2d 908, 912 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993).
245. See, e.g., infra notes 265-69 and accompanying text (discussing Louisiana's
stricter products liability doctrine).
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tiffs from establishing their cases. In any case involving a prod-
uct that is destroyed or seriously damaged, in these two states a
plaintiff may be barred from suing under a strict liability theory
because of an inability to prove the existence of a defect at the
time the product left the manufacturer.246
The Alabama-Tennessee approach limits the effectiveness of
strict liability as a safety-inducing legal framework because
more defective products can be made and marketed by the man-
ufacturer with less risk of adverse judgments than under a sys-
tem allowing inferential proof of defect.247 Manufacturers will
take even greater advantage of this relaxation when a defect is
likely to destroy the product. At the margins, manufacturers
may actually have a disincentive to create safer products under
such a system, because if they can build products that are de-
stroyed easily, then they can erase some risk of manufacturing
defect liability.
Other states have rejected the extension of res ipsa loquitur
on different grounds. In Montana, the doctrine can be used only
for human conduct;"8 in Mississippi, the doctrine is viewed as
an evidence doctrine only;"4 in Ohio, the doctrine can be used
only after a plaintiff has established his prima facie strict liabili-
ty case." ° These decisions reflect a cramped view of the utility
of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Res ipsa is a tool of circum-
stantial evidence"5 and as such should not be limited to negli-
gence cases necessarily. Res ipsa is also based in part on proba-
bility and in part on the plaintiff's relative lack of information
vis A vis the defendant as to the nature of the accident.25 2 It
was developed so that, when direct proof of the cause of an inju-
ry was lacking, the plaintiff could make his prima facie case
circumstantially and then compel the defendant to provide an
246. A plaintiff will not be as hampered by these decisions if the claim is a design
defect claim or defective warning claim because the plaintiff can examine the design
or warning of a product not involved in the accident.
247. See Montgomery & Owen, supra note 229, at 809-10.
248. See Brothers v. General Motors Corp., 658 P.2d 1108, 1110 (Mont. 1983).
249. See Powe v. Wagner Elec. Sales Corp., 589 F. Supp. 657, 661 (S.D. Miss. 1984).
250. See State Auto Mut. Ins. Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 304 N.E.2d 891, 894-95 (Ohio 1973).
251. See supra notes 25-30 and accompanying text.
252. See supra notes 25-36 and accompanying text.
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explanation. 3 Plaintiffs in products liability actions are often
at a similar disadvantage regarding proof of defectiveness and
access to information. The drafters of the proposed Restatement
(Third) of Torts have noted that both res ipsa loquitur and strict
liability were created to aid plaintiffs in cases involving difficult
proof issues.' Practically speaking, the court decisions in
these states mean that these states, like California, have a com-
paratively less strict form of strict liability than states recogniz-
ing the doctrine's applicability, because one potential vehicle of
circumstantial proof of defectiveness has been rejected.
Criticisms of States Viewing the Cross-Applicability of Res Ipsa
Loquitur More Favorably
Court opinions in Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, and Wash-
ington have all hinted at the potential availability of res ipsa lo-
quitur in strict products liability claims." The opinions are
similar in that they all recognize that common experience can be
used to infer defect;"5 none of the opinions, however, has held
that res ipsa loquitur is available outside the realm of negli-
gence. The recognition that common experience may be used to
infer defect suggests that courts in these states are closer to rec-
ognizing the utility of res ipsa loquitur in a strict liability claim
than are the Alabama and Tennessee courts; yet none of the
courts has been willing to recognize that res ipsa loquitur would
provide a very effective inferential tool to help determine the
likelihood of certain types of product defects. Both the tradition-
253. See SHAIN, supra note 30, at 85-112 (tracing the historical development of res
ipsa loquitur in England and concluding that the doctrine shifted the burden of
proof to the defendant when it was invoked).
254. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. a (Tentative
Draft No. 2, 1995).
255. Court opinions in all four states noted that common experience may be used
to infer a product's defectiveness. See Embs v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., 528 S.W.2d
703, 706 (Ky. Ct. App. 1975); Harrison v. Bill Cairns Pontiac, 549 A.2d 385, 390
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1988) (noting that common experience is one of five factors that
determine whether a defect could be inferred); Crump v. MacNaught P.T.Y. Ltd., 743
S.W.2d 532, 535 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987); Bombardi v. Pochel's Appliance & TV Co., 518
P.2d 202, 204 (Wash. Ct. App. 1973).
256. See Embs, 528 S.W.2d at 706; Harrison, 549 A.2d at 390; Crump, 743 S.W.2d
at 535; Bombardi, 518 P.2d at 204.
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al and the Second Restatement versions of the res ipsa loquitur
test are merely attempts to determine judicially and with more
precision when to allow a plaintiff to invoke the "common expe-
rience" argument.1
7
Arkansas, Georgia, and Florida courts have shown a greater
degree of doctrinal flexibility, yet these courts also have refrained
from holding that res ipsa loquitur may be applied in strict liabil-
ity claims. Instead, courts in all three states allow similar infer-
ences, with Arkansas and Georgia courts noting that the infer-
ences at the heart of the doctrine can be applied in a strict liabili-
ty claim." s Rather than creating new inferential schemes, these
courts should recognize that the res ipsa doctrine can be trans-
planted to serve within the contours of strict liability equally as
well as it can in negligence. 9 The Restatement test of res ipsa
loquitur, reconfigured for a defect analysis, could demonstrate
that the probability of certain defects existing at the time the
product left the manufacturer was sufficiently high to warrant
allowing an inference or even a presumption of defect.26
Hawaii and Wisconsin both have recognized that res ipsa lo-
quitur may be used to prove product defectiveness in a strict
liability setting."' Neither state, however, grants the doctrine
the proper procedural effect when a manufacturing defect is al-
leged." 2 Due to the manufacturer's superior knowledge regard-
ing the manufacturing process, the maxim that manufacturers
are better able to spread the risk of loss, and the safety incen-
tives that are implicit in a strict liability system, res ipsa loqui-
257. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
258. See Williams v. Smart Chevrolet Co., 730 S.W.2d 479, 482 (Ark. 1987); Lang
v. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 287 S.E.2d 729, 731-32 (Ga. Ct. App. 1982); see also
Cassisi v. Maytag Co., 396 So. 2d 1140, 1148 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (approving
the inference of defect doctrine outlined in Greco v. Bucciconi Eng'g Co., 283 F.
Supp. 978 (W.D. Pa. 1967), affd, 407 F.2d 87 (3d Cir. 1969)).
259. The proposal section of this Note explains this viewpoint fully.
260. See infra notes 327-37 and accompanying text for a modified Restatement test
of res ipsa loquitur for proving defects.
261. See Jenkins v. Whittaker Corp., 785 F.2d 720, 733 (9th Cir. 1986) (citing
Stewart v. Ford Motor Co., 553 F.2d 130, 138 (D.C. Cir. 1977)) (noting that "nothing
bars application of the res ipsa loquitur theory to strict liability"); Rennick v.
Fruehauf Corp., 264 N.W.2d 264, 267-68 (Wis. 1978) (allowing a res ipsa jury in-
struction in a strict liability case).
262. The proposal section of this Note explains this viewpoint fully.
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tur should receive a presumptive effect when plaintiffs invoke it
in manufacturing defect cases. Such a presumption would
make it easier for plaintiffs to establish their cases and force the
defendants, at a minimum, to produce exculpatory evidence.
This approach would, in a narrow class of defect cases, return to
the doctrine the procedural weight that it originally had in early
English and American cases.2"
A PROPOSAL FOR THE APPLICABILITY OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR IN
MANUFACTURING DEFECT CASES
Of all the states, Louisiana comes closest to the approach ad-
vocated in this Note regarding the proper use of res ipsa loqui-
tur in certain strict products liability claims. In Louisiana, res
ipsa loquitur can establish that a product was defective. 5 In
the field of negligence, the doctrine shifts the ultimate burden of
persuasion to the defendant to show an absence of negli-
gence.66 This approach aids plaintiffs and makes strict lia-
bility in Louisiana relatively more strict than strict liability in
the other states discussed throughout this Note. This strictness
coincides with the goals that support strict liability and should
produce added safety incentives for manufacturers. 67 Although
Louisiana courts have allowed the doctrine to be used in strict
liability settings, the courts have articulated a test for res ipsa
loquitur in Louisiana that mimics the traditional test but re-
quires an additional showing that the defendant had superior
access to the knowledge needed to explain the accident.2" Pro-
263. See supra notes 226-32 and accompanying text; infra notes 269-92 and accom-
panying text (discussing the differences among design, warning, and manufacturing
defect cases).
264. See SHAIN, supra note 30, at 85-149 (outlining the procedural effect given res
ipsa loquitur by early English and American courts).
265. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Wrap-On Co., 626 So. 2d 874, 876-77
(La. Ct. App. 1993).
266. See Ray v. Ameri-Care Hosp., 400 So. 2d 1127, 1133 (La. Ct. App. 1981);
Horton v. Seligman & Latz, Inc., 260 So. 2d 731, 734 (La. Ct. App. 1972);
Boudreaux v. American Ins. Co., 245 So. 2d 794, 797 (La. Ct. App. 1971).
267. See supra notes 226-32 and accompanying text.
268. See Wells v. Woman's Hosp. Found., 286 So. 2d 439, 441 (La. Ct. App. 1973)
(requiring that information regarding the cause of the accident be more readily
available to the defendant before the doctrine will apply).
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cedurally, the knowledge requirement of the Louisiana test
should be separated from the actual test for res ipsa loquitur so
that it controls not whether the doctrine may be used, but rath-
er, what procedural effect should be bestowed upon the doctrine,
consistent with social policy and fairness. Substantively, this
Note proposes two improvements upon the current Louisiana
scheme with regard to res ipsa loquitur's entry into strict liabili-
ty. First, res ipsa should be limited to manufacturing defect cas-
es. Second, the doctrine should include a two-tiered system of
presumptions hinging on the defendant's access to information
regarding the defect.
The Distinction Between Manufacturing Defect Cases and Design
and Warning Defect Cases
This Note's proposal is confined to situations involving allega-
tions of manufacturing defects. Manufacturing defects occur
when an individual product varies to too great a degree from the
specified design of the product.269 Examples include physically
flawed products or incorrectly assembled products.27 The pro-
posal is confined to manufacturing defects based on the rationale
outlined by the American Law Institute's Product Liability Sec-
tion in their recently proposed revisions to the Restatement
(Second) of Torts." The American Law Institute separated the
three strict liability claims (manufacturing defect, design defect,
and warning defect) and gave each claim its own test.2 This
269. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. b (Tentative
Draft No. 2, 1995); id. § 2 cmt. b (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1994).
270. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. b (Tentative
Draft No. 2, 1995); id. § 2 cmt. b (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1994); see also LOUIS R.
FRUMER & MELVIN I. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILrrY § 11.02 (1995) (discussing
manufacturing defect claims).
271. Both drafts of the Restatement (Third) indicate that a different form of re-
sponsibility is implicated when design defects or warning defects are alleged. See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. a (Tentative Draft
No. 2, 1995); id. § 2 cmt. a (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1994).
272. The drafters have attempted to clarify the scope and nature of the liability
imposed on product manufacturers depending on the type of defect alleged. They
propose:
§ 2. Categories of Product Defect
For purposes of determining liability under § 1:
(a) a product contains a manufacturing defect when the product de-
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separation results in a producer or distributor of a product being
held strictly liable for manufacturing defects regardless of the
degree of care used, although a pr6ducer could avoid liability in
design and warning defect claims if the harm was not
foreseeable or if reasonable alterations or warnings could not
avoid the harm.273 The drafters made this decision because
manufacturing defects involve many fewer, if any, risk-versus-
utility calculations than do the other types of defects. 4 If a
product is manufactured defectively, then the risk that comes
with it has no concomitant benefit, whereas a product may be
designed in such a manner that it is dangerous but the utility of
the product is, in society's collective view, worth the risk.275
Similarly, a consumer may be aware of the design risk of the
product and decide to use the product anyway, but a manufac-
turing defect provides the consumer with no notice of the risk
unless it is patently obvious.
Increased safety is another important rationale for the separa-
tion of manufacturing defects from the other two forms of de-
fects.276 Holding a manufacturer very strictly liable for defects
that could be lessened or averted through increased inspections
or quality control is much fairer than imposing very strict liabil-
ity on a manufacturer for a defect in a design that may be as safe
parts from its intended design even though all possible care was exer-
cised in the preparation and marketing of the product;
(b) a product is defective in design when the foreseeable risks of
harm posed by the product could have been reduced or avoided by the
adoption of a reasonable -alternative design by the seller or other distrib-
utor, or a predecessor in the commercial chain of distribution, and the
omission of the alternative design renders the product not reasonably
safe;
c) a product is defective because of inadequate instructions or warn-
ings when the foreseeable risks of harm 'Posed by the product could have
been reduced or avoided by the provision of reasonable instructions or
warnings by the seller or other distributor, or a predecessor in the com-
mercial chain of distribution, and the omission of the instructions or
warnings renders the product not reasonably safe.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1995).
273. See id.
274. See id. § 2 cmt. a.
275. See generally id. (discussing the policy rationales behind imposing stricter lia-
bility for manufacturing defects than for design and warning defects).
276. See id.
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as technically possible, yet is still dangerous.277 The belief that
product producers consciously choose the appropriate level of
quality control such that, in some sense, they are at "fault" for
any resulting injuries underlies this rationale." 8 If this concep-
tion is correct, a very strict liability framework for manufacturing
defects should create an incentive for producers to increase their
efforts at quality control and thereby create safer products.279
Finally, very strict liability for manufacturing defects can be
viewed as a direct outgrowth of the contractual theory of implied
warranty of merchantability. This doctrine holds a commercial
seller strictly liable if the product sold is not of merchantable
quality."0 Strict liability in tort for product defects is really a
restatement of this doctrine applied to a more expansive set-
ting." 1 One of the fundamental premises of strict liability in
tort is that a manufacturer has promised implicitly that the
product will be manufactured correctly and should be held liable
if the product is found to be otherwise.282
Even absent the American Law Institute's proposal to create
distinct tests for each type of defect claim, res ipsa loquitur does
not provide the same benefit or the same degree of probability in
a design or warning situation as it does in a manufacturing de-
277. See id.; Klein, supra note 63 (discussing the state of 'the art defense to strict
liability). The term "very strictly liable" refers to the proposed ALI manufacturing
defect test. See supra note 272.
278. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTs: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. a (Tentative
Draft No. 2, 1995).
279. A government report on products liability litigation indicated that the imposi-
tion of strict liability under Restatement section 402A generated increased quality
control efforts by many manufacturers. See COMIERCE REPORT, supra note 232, at
IV-6 to 7.
280. Under the Uniform Commercial Code, if a seller is a merchant of the good he
is selling, a warranty of merchantability is implied in every sales contract. See
U.C.C. § 2-314 (1978). Merchantability requires a good to be "fit for the ordinary
purposes for which such goods are used." Id. § 2-314(c).
281. The concept of strict liability in tort does not include the requirement of privi-
ty and does not require the transaction to be a commercial transaction. See RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
282. See id cmt. c (stating that the imposition of strict liability is based on the
"special responsibility" a manufacturer has to the public); see also Greenman v. Yuba
Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 901 (Cal. 1962) (stating that "[i]mplicit in the
machine's presence on the market, however, [is] a representation that it [will] safely
do the jobs for which it was built").
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fect situation. Design defect claims focus on the nature of the
correctly manufactured product, yet assert that the product is
unacceptably dangerous even when perfectly constructed.,
Res ipsa loquitur, with its focus on the specific incident, is poor-
ly suited to provide proof of a systemic defect. Furthermore, if
the plaintiff alleges a design or warning defect, then the infor-
mational advantage of the defendant is less compelling because
the plaintiff can inspect other products and the design speci-
fications and/or warnings for the product.2 Res ipsa loquitur
is also poorly suited for invocation in a failure to warn case. It is
too great a logical leap to attempt to infer from an accident that
a product's warning was defective. Like design defect cases,
failure to warn cases implicate other factors, such as the foresee-
ability of the harm and the likelihood that a warning would
prevent the harm.2
In addition to being better suited to manufacturing defects,
res ipsa loquitur is arguably more needed in such cases. To
prove a manufacturing defect, the plaintiff must prove that a
defect existed in the actual product that caused the injury. 6
Comparison to other products might help, but the crux of the
needed proof requires that the specific product in question be
proven defective. Such proof may be difficult to obtain when the
product is highly technical in nature or is destroyed in the inju-
ry-producing event.287 Design and failure to warn cases have
283. Under the consumer expectation test, a product is designed defectively if the
product is more dangerous than a reasonable consumer would expect it to be when
using it in a foreseeable manner. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS
LIABILITY § 2 cmt. g (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1995); id. (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1994).
The risk-utility test of design defectiveness exposes a manufacturer to liability if the
utility of the design does not outweigh the risk. See Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 573
P.2d 443, 455-56 (Cal. 1978).
284. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 3 cmt. b (Tentative
Draft No. 1, 1994) (noting the difference in the availability of proof in manufacturing
defect claims versus design or warning defect claims).
285. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTE: PRODUCTS LIABiLITY § 3 cmt. h (Tenta-
tive Draft No. 2, 1995).
286. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. g (1965).
287. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTE: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 3 cmt. b (Tentative
Draft No. 1, 1994) (noting that plaintiffs asserting manufacturing defect claims may
be disadvantaged because the individual product "may be destroyed, lost, or other-
wise unavailable to the plaintiff after the product-related accident").
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no temporal element in their proof structures; if the product de-
sign or warning is defective, it was always defective.2" Manu-
facturing defects, on the other hand, have a critical temporal
proof requirement: the defect had to exist when the product left
the manufacturer's control.289 This temporal element can be
very difficult to prove, given the nature of the claim and the
plaintiffs relative lack of information regarding the production
processes at the plant." Helping plaintiffs overcome this "time
of defect" hurdle would advance a crucial goal of the strict prod-
ucts liability system: increasing manufacturer incentives to
make safer products.2 ' Res ipsa loquitur, a test of probabili-
ty,292 can provide this assistance.
A PROPOSAL FOR INTEGRATING RES IPSA LOQUITUR INTO THE
PROOF STRUCTURE FOR STRICT LIABILITY MANUFACTURING
DEFECT CLAIMS
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur should be allowed in strict
liability settings to prove manufacturing defects. This extension
is justified based upon the rationales for distinguishing manu-
facturing defects from design and warning defects, the social
policy goal of increasing incentives for manufacturers to market
safer products, and the need to assist plaintiffs because proof of
the defect may be difficult to obtain.2 9 Allowing res ipsa loqui-
tur to assist plaintiffs in proving manufacturing defects is also
consistent with the policy rationale behind the imposition of a
stricter standard of liability for manufacturing defects294 be-
cause the doctrine will help ensure that the strictness of the test
is not weakened by proof problems. Because of the policy goals
288. To avoid liability, however, a manufacturer can always claim buyer misuse or
alteration. See FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 270, § 8:04[1l] (discussing available
defenses to strict liability claims).
289. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. b (Tentative
Draft No. 2, 1995).
290. See Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 441 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor,
J., concurring).
291. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmts. c, h (1965).
292. See 1 SPEISER, supra note 1, § 1:1.
293. See supra notes 269-92 and accompanying text.
294. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. a (Tentative
Draft No. 2, 1995).
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of the strict liability system, the doctrine should be granted a
greater procedural effect than it is afforded in a traditional neg-
ligence setting.
Historical and Policy Justifications for Granting Res Ipsa
Loquitur Presumptive Force in Manufacturing Defect Cases
Res ipsa loquitur, if established by the plaintiff, should have a
presumptive effect when it is applied in a manufacturing defect
scenario. The procedural effect of the presumption would be de-
termined by whether the plaintiff could make an initial showing
that the defendant had greater knowledge or access to informa-
tion regarding the nature of the accident and potential de-
fect."5 If the plaintiff could satisfy this procedural hurdle, then
res ipsa loquitur would create a presumption of defect and shift
to the defendant the burden of persuasion on the issue of prod-
uct defectiveness.296 If the plaintiff could not make this initial
showing of knowledge by the defendant, then the doctrine, if
established, would create a presumption of defect but only shift
to the defendant the burden of production."'7
Historical precedent supports giving res ipsa loquitur a pre-
sumptive effect. Res ipsa loquitur had presumptive force as origi-
nally formulated and applied in England."' If the doctrine was
invoked properly, it shifted the burden of persuasion on the issue
of negligence to the defendant."'9 One commentator has noted
that, "[iun the pre-Thayer-Wigmore period, the settled law in
295. See FED. R. EviD. 104 (discussing the standard of proof necessary under the
federal system for establishing certain preliminary factual issues). Under the propos-
al outlined in this Note, a plaintiff would have to demonstrate to the court "evidence
sufficient to support a finding" that the defendant had superior knowledge regarding
the nature of the product and event. See id.
296. See infra notes 310-18 and accompanying text (discussing different views re-
garding the appropriate procedural effect of presumptions).
297. See infra note 332 and accompanying text. The production shift would be a
true shift. Under the proposal, a defendant having the burden of production would
suffer a directed verdict if that defendant offered no rebuttal evidence. But see 1
SPEISER, supra note 1, § 3:14 (discussing the majority view that res ipsa loquitur
may shift the burden of production but does not compel the defendant to come for-
ward with evidence).
298. See SHAIN, supra note 30, at 92-93 (noting that British opinions suggested
that negligence was presumed).
299. See id.
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America was in accord with British decisions." 00 Most states
and the United States Supreme Court embraced this presump-
tive view of res ipsa.3 0 ' Not until Sweeney v. Erving0 2 did the
Supreme Court declare that the doctrine did not shift the burden
of persuasion or the burden of production.0 3
In addition to the historical justification for granting res ipsa
loquitur a presumptive effect in manufacturing defect cases, the
factors that judges and legislators use in determining whether to
recognize a presumption support granting the doctrine this
heightened procedural effect in products liability cases. Pre-
sumptions are created for a variety of reasons: probability, effi-
ciency, fairness, imbalanced access to information, social policy,
and assistance in difficult proof situations.0 4 A presumption of
a manufacturing defect upon establishment of res ipsa loquitur
is consistent with these goals.
In terms of probability, it is more probable than not that if the
elements of res ipsa loquitur are established in a given situa-
tion, the product was defective when it left the manufactur-
er.305 This probability exists because the basis of res ipsa loqui-
tur is the exclusion of as many other potential causes of the
injury to the extent possible.0 6 Strict liability is premised in
part on the social policy of encouraging safer products.3 7 Al-
lowing res ipsa loquitur a presumptive effect would make liabili-
ty for manufacturing defects stricter and increase the incentives
for companies to reduce manufacturing defects to avoid liabili-
ty.3 8 Fairness and informational advantages are also impli-
300. Id. at 112.
301. See id. at 120 n.161. For example, in San Juan Light & Transit Co. v.
Requena, 224 U.S. 89, 98-99 (1912), the Supreme Court held that when the doctrine
is established it affords reasonable evidence of negligence absent an explanation by
the defendant.
302. 228 U.S. 233 (1913).
303. See id. at 240-42.
304. See MARTIN, supra note 239, § 3.02; see also Rules of Evidence for United
State Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183, 208 (1973) (stating that "fairness, poli-
cy, and probability.., underlie the creation of presumptions").
305. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328D (1965); PROSSER, supra note 68,
§ 103, at 673-75.
306. See RESTATEMiENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328D cmt. e.
307. See supra note 232 and accompanying text.
308. See supra note 232 and accompanying text.
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cated because manufacturers are generally in a better position
to determine whether a defect in a product existed, °9 and cer-
tainly in a better position to develop evidence to refute such an
accusation.
The factors that support the creation of a presumption also
support the recognition of a procedural effect beyond that recog-
nized under the Federal Rules of Evidence. Under the Federal
Rules of Evidence, presumptions only shift the burden of produc-
tion and do not shift the ultimate burden of persuasion." ° This
view of presumptions is not universal and not without criti-
cism.31' Most states employ a variety of presumptions with dif-
fering procedural effects depending on the nature of the pre-
sumption.312 In California and Hawaii, the state evidence codes
set out different lists of presumptions, some of which affect the
burden of persuasion and others of which affect the burden of
production."3 When the Federal Rules of Evidence were draft-
ed, the Supreme Court supported the version of Rule 301 where-
by the burden of persuasion on the fact in issue would be shift-
ed.3" Congress rejected this approach and instead embraced
the current version of the rule."1 5
The Supreme Court, in its Advisory Committee Note to its
proposed presumption rule, rejected the "bursting bubble" theory
of presumptions as not according presumptions a sufficient ef-
fect."1 6 Other scholars have commented that social policy and
309. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. a (Tentative
Draft No. 2, 1995); Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 441 (Cal. 1944)
(Traynor, J., concurring).
310. See FED. R. EVID. 301.
311. See supra note 240 and accompanying text.
312. See JACK B. WEINSTEIN ET AL., WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 301[05] (1996) (noting
that states have taken many different approaches to the procedural effect given to
presumptions).
313. See HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 626-301 to -304 (1985); supra note 238 and accompa-
nying text. The comments to California's evidence code and Hawaii's evidence code
refer to Professor Bohlen's work as being the rationale responsible for dividing the
presumptions into two types. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 601 cmt. (West 1995); HAW.
REV. STAT. § 626, Rule 302 cmt. (1985).
314. See Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, supra note
304, at 208 (noting that the policy behind presumptions supports an increased proce-
dural effect).
315. See MARTIN, supra note 239, § 3.04.
316. See Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, supra note
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fairness should determine which party will bear the burden of
persuasion.317 Professor Bohlen outlined a system of presump-
tions premised on the belief that presumptions grounded in so-
cial policy and probability should shift the burden of persuasion,
whereas presumptions not based on those rationales should only
shift the burden of production.318 The comments to the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts section 328D note that some courts his-
torically have granted the doctrine a greater procedural effect if
the defendant "ha[s] undertaken a special responsibility toward
the plaintiff."319 Manufacturers have a 'special relationship"
with buyers because buyers place their trust in manufacturers
to produce safe products.32 Therefore, precedent exists to in-
fuse the doctrine with a heightened procedural effect.
Courts already shift the burden of persuasion over to the de-
fendant in certain strict liability situations.321 For example, the
California Supreme Court outlined a two-part strict liability test
for design defects that shifts the burden over to the defendant to
justify the product design.3 ' Furthermore, courts and legisla-
304, at 208 (citing Edmund M. Morgan & John MacArthur Maguire, Looking Back-
ward and Forward at Euidence, 50 HARV. L. REV. 909, 913 (1937)). The "bursting
bubble" view of presumptions, adopted by Congress, was championed by Professor
Thayer. See JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE
COMMON LAW ch. 9 (Rothman Reprints 1969) (1898) (discussing burden of proof is-
sues). Under Thayer's framework, presumptions should only affect the burden of pro-
duction; once the defendant has come forward with sufficient evidence to call into
question a presumed fact, the presumption drops out of sight entirely and the evi-
dence is weighed as if no presumption had ever been in place. See id. at 376-84.
317. See EDMUND MORRIS MORGAN, SOME PROBLEMS OF PROOF UNDER THE ANGLO-
AMERICAN SYSTEM OF LITIGATION 80 (Greenwood Press 1975) (1956).
318. See Bohlen, supra note 240. California and Hawaii have embraced this ap-
proach. See supra note 313.
319. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328D cmt. b (1965).
320. See supra note 232 and accompanying text.
321. See, e.g., Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 573 P.2d 443, 455 (Cal. 1978) (shifting the
burden over to the defendant in design defect cases to show that the product's utili-
ty outweighed the risk that it posed to the plaintiff).
322. Under the Barker test for design defects, a plaintiff can prevail in two differ-
ent ways. See id. The plaintiff can win either by establishing that the product failed
to satisfy the consumer expectation test, see id. at 455-56, or by establishing that
the design defect proximately caused the injury with the defense failing to prove
that the utility of the product outweighed the product's risk. See id. at 456. In Soule
v. General Motors Corp., 882 P.2d 298, 311 n.8 (Cal. 1994), the California Supreme
Court appeared to reaffirm the use of the Barker test. Other states also have adopt-
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tors have shifted the burden of persuasion to the defendant in
other situations in which social policy and fairness dictated the
shift. In Title VII employment discrimination suits, the Supreme
Court shifted the burden of persuasion to the defendant in
mixed motive cases to prove the action was based on a nondis-
criminatory motive. 3' The Court defended the shift on the ba-
sis of fairness. 24 In California, the legislature created a pre-
sumption of a failure to exercise due care that shifts the full
burden to the defendant when the defendant's conduct violated a
rule or regulation and the conduct proximately caused death or
injury to an individual or property.3' At common law, courts
created a presumption to shift the burden of persuasion to the
defendant in actions by passengers against common carriers.326
Both from a historical basis and a policy basis, therefore, grant-
ing res ipsa a presumptive effect is not a major doctrinal revolu-
tion in the law, but rather a recognition of the compatibility of
the policy rationales behind res ipsa loquitur, strict liability, and
evidentiary presumptions.
Reconfiguring Res Ipsa Loquitur To Prove Defectiveness
The final requirement needed to allow res ipsa loquitur to
serve duty in strict liability manufacturing defect cases is the
creation of a test that will establish that a product was manu-
factured defectively with a sufficient degree of certainty. Most
states have used one of three different tests of res ipsa: the tra-
ditional test,327 the modified traditional test,328 and the Re-
ed the Barker burden-shifting approach. See Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593
P.2d 871, 885 (Alaska 1979); Ontai v. Straub Clinic & Hosp. Inc., 659 P.2d 734, 740
(Haw. 1983).
323. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 258 (1989) (holding that a
"defendant may avoid ... liability only by proving by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that it would have made the same decision even if it had not taken the
plaintiffs gender into account").
324. See id. at 248 (noting that it is fair to place the burden on the defendant
when it has been shown that the defendant relied upon an impermissible motive);
see also id. at 263 (analogizing to the law of torts, which sometimes shifts the bur-
den to the defendant for fairness reasons, especially in multiple causation situations)
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
325. See CAL. EviD. CODE § 669 (West 1995).
326. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 328D cmt. b (1965).
327. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
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statement (Second) of Torts test.3" This Note embraces the Re-
statement test because that test does not require the plaintiff to
show that the defendant had exclusive control; it more percep-
tively requires the plaintiff to establish that the probable cause
of the accident was "one which the defendant was under a duty
to the plaintiff to anticipate or guard against."30 As noted in
the Restatement comments, the plaintiff's ultimate burden is to
produce evidence that it is more probable than not that the
defendant's conduct caused the accident.3 3'
Using the Restatement test for res ipsa as a baseline, this
Note fashions an appropriate res ipsa test for manufacturing
defect cases. Following is an outline of the proposed test for res
ipsa in manufacturing defect cases:3 2
(1) It may be presumed that harm suffered by the plaintiff
is caused by a manufacturing defect in a product manufac-
tured by the Defendant when
(a) the event is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in
the absence of a manufacturing defect in the product;
(b) other responsible causes, including the conduct of the
plaintiff and third persong, are sufficiently eliminated by the
evidence; and
(c) it is more likely than not given a totality of the circum-
stances surrounding the event that the defect existed at the
time the product left the manufacturer's control.
(2) It is the function of the court to determine whether the
presumption may reasonably be drawn by the jury, and to
determine the procedural effect to be given the presumption.
(a) if the plaintiff puts forward evidence sufficient to sup-
port a finding that the defendant had superior knowledge
regarding the product or the accident then the judge shall
instruct the jury that the doctrine, if established, will create a
presumption of defectiveness and shift to the defendant the
burden of production and the burden of persuasion on the
328. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
329. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
330. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328D cmt. g.
331. See id. cmt. e.
332. The italicized portions of the test indicate my own suggested changes to the
Restatement test for res ipsa loquitur in a negligence setting. See supra note 33 to
compare the tests manufacturing defect version with its negligence version.
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issue of defectiveness.
(b) if the plaintiff fails to make the showing required in
(2)(a) then the judge shall instruct the jury that the presump-
tion shifts to the defendant only the burden of production.
(3) It is the function of the jury to determine liability con-
sistent with the judge's instructions at the end of the case re-
garding the effect of the presumption.
Both proposed revisions of the Restatement (Second) of Torts
contain sections recognizing that product defectiveness can be
inferred from the circumstances surrounding the accident.333 In
each draft, the authors recognized that the inference of defect is
most likely to apply in manufacturing defect cases because of
the unit-specific nature of manufacturing defect claims and be-
cause of the chance that the product may not be available to the
plaintiff for analysis.3 4 Thus, the drafters of the Restatement
333. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 3 (Tentative Draft
No. 1, 1994). Section 3 states:
When a product fails to function as a reasonable person would ex-
pect it to function and causes harm under circumstances where it is
more probable than not that the malfunction was caused by a manufac-
turing defect, the trier of fact may infer that such a defect caused the
malfunction and plaintiff need not specify the nature of the defect.
Id. (emphasis added); see also id. (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1995) (taking an approach
quite similar to the Restatement definition of res ipsa loquitur, see RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 328D (1965), and the approach outlined by this Note). Section
3 of the second draft states:
It may be inferred that the harm sustained by the plaintiff was caused
by a product defect, without proof of the specific nature of the defect,
when:
(a) the incident resulting in the harm was of a kind that ordinarily
would occur only as a result of product defect; and
(b) evidence in the particular case supports the conclusion that more
probably than not:
(1) the cause of the harm was a product defect rather than other
possible causes, including the conduct of the plaintiff and third persons;
and
(2) the product defect existed at the time of sale or distribution.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 3 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1995).
334. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 3 cmt. b (Tentative
Draft No. 1, 1994). The first proposal limited the inference of defect to manufactur-
ing claims. See id. The second proposal did not limit the use of the inference to
manufacturing defect claims but noted that the inference will most often apply in
manufacturing defect scenarios. See id. § 3 cmt. b (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1995).
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recognized the heightened probative value and utility of circum-
stantial evidence of defect when a manufacturing defect claim is
alleged as compared to when another product liability claim is
alleged. The language of the second proposal mirrors closely the
test outlined above. The drafters, however, limited the procedur-
al weight of the test to an inference. 5 This Note's proposal
embraces the American Law Institute's view that circumstantial
evidence of defectiveness arising from the context of the accident
should be limited to the manufacturing defect context. Addition-
ally, this proposal contends that, instead of crafting an entirely
new inferential doctrine for defectiveness, states should use the
aforementioned modified res ipsa loquitur test, with its greater
procedural weight, in manufacturing defect cases.
The modified res ipsa test, coupled with the initial determina-
tion of whether the defendant had greater knowledge regarding
the product or the accident, will advance the social policy goals
inherent in the strict products liability system without exposing
manufacturers to unjustified liability. Under this proposal, a
manufacturer will not be held absolutely liable for manufactur-
ing defects, nor will a manufacturer be required to insure for all
manufacturing defects. To recover, and before being allowed to
use res ipsa loquitur to create a presumption of defectiveness,
the plaintiff will have to provide sufficient evidence. Even then,
if the plaintiff fails to convince the judge that the defendant had
superior knowledge, the presumption places only the burden of
production on the defendant and the burden of persuasion as to
product defectiveness remains with the plaintiff." Finally,
even if the plaintiff takes full advantage of the new, heightened
procedural effect of res ipsa loquitur in manufacturing defect
cases, the defendant can still escape liability by convincing a
jury that the product was not defective."3 ' This burden is justi-
fied, given the superior knowledge the defendant possesses re-
garding the manufacturing of the product and the quality con-
trol processes implicated.
335. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 3 (Tentative Draft
No. 2, 1995); id. (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1994).
336. The presumption disappears once the burden of production is met. See 2
MCCOR MCK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 38, § 344(A), at 582-86.
337. See supra note 62.
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State Products Liability Reform Legislation Does Not Clash with
This Proposal
State legislatures have been active in this area since the judi-
ciary began recognizing strict products liability, defining the con-
tours of strict liability in their respective states. Several state
codes now establish umbrella "products liability actions" that en-
compass all of the separate theories of liability for product inju-
ry, including strict tort liability, negligence, and warranty-based
claims.3 ' The state code provisions can be grouped into four
major categories: limitations on who can be held liable for defec-
tive products, 39 limitations on the admissibility of certain
types of evidence," ° statute of limitations standards,341 and
defenses to strict products liability actions. 2 An analysis of
current state code provisions reveals no legislative barriers to
the presumptive use of res ipsa in manufacturing defect cases.
The most prevalent statutory limitation on strict products lia-
bility actions has been to limit who can be held liable for a de-
fective product. A number of states either ban the imposition of
liability on a nonmanufacturer seller of the product outright, or
hold a seller liable only if the manufacturer is jurisdictionally
unavailable. 43 Other states limit seller liability by mandating
338. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-572n (West 1991 & Supp. 1996) (estab-
lishing a products liability claim "in lieu of all other claims"); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-
3301 (1983) (establishing a products liability claim that includes all previously exist-
ing theories of recovery); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2945 (West Supp. 1996) (de-
fining a products liability action to include equitable and legal recovery theories).
339. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-402 (1987) (limiting seller exposure to lia-
bility unless the manufacturer is beyond reach).
340. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE §.6-1306 (1990) (declaring as inadmissible subsequent
remedial measures).
341. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507-D:2 (1983) (limiting the availability of
claims to 12 years after the manufacturer sells the final product).
342. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3303 (establishing a presumption that a prod-
uct that is 10 years old or older is not defective).
343. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-402 (insulating the seller from liability unless
jurisdiction over the manufacturer cannot be obtained); IDAHO CODE § 6-1307 (insu-
lating the seller from liability if the seller had no reasonable opportunity to inspect
the product even if such an inspection should have revealed the defect); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 411.340 (Michie 1992) (insulating the seller from liability if the seller
can show that the product was sold by him in its original condition); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 544.41 (West 1988) (insulating the seller from liability unless the plaintiff
can prove any of the factors outlined in the code to extend liability to the seller);
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that the manufacturer defend the action or indemnify the sell-
er.3" This Note's proposal is consistent with the legislative in-
tent of these code restrictions. The broad aim of such state code
provisions is to protect from liability sellers who were not re-
sponsible for the defective product. 5 Res ipsa loquitur, when
applied in manufacturing defect cases, would focus on the manu-
facturer of the product because one of the elements of the test
involves proving that it was more probable than not that the
product was defective when it left the manufacturer's con-
trol. 4' Therefore, a plaintiff could use res ipsa loquitur against
a seller only if the seller altered the product in some way. Code
provisions that limit seller liability usually exempt seller alter-
ation of the product. 47
The other major legislative incursion into strict products lia-
bility has involved outlining defenses to strict products liability
actions. Several states have recognized a "state of the art" de-
fense. 48 Still other states have developed the "useful life" con-
cept to limit liability for product injuries if the product is beyond
a certain age.349 Finally, two states have recognized a pre-
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99B-2 (1995) (limiting seller's liability if the product was sold as
it was received and the seller did not have an opportunity to inspect it); N.D. CENT.
CODE §§ 28-01.3-04 to -05 (Supp. 1995) (limiting seller liability and indemnifying the
seller as well); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28-106 (Supp. 1996) (limiting seller liability
unless the manufacturer is beyond jurisdictional reach). Other states ban seller lia-
bility outright. See GA. CODE ANN. § 51-1-11.1 (Supp. 1996); 735 ILL. COMIP. STAT.
ANN. 5/13-213 (West Supp. 1996); IOWA CODE ANN. § 613.18 (West Supp. 1996);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21,181 (1995); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.72.040 (West 1992).
344. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-684 (West 1992) (mandating that the manufac-
turer indemnify the seller if the manufacturer refuses to accept a seller's tendered
offer of defense); N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01.3-05 (1995) (indemnifying the seller
against any liability under certain circumstances).
345. See supra notes 311-12 and accompanying text.
346. See supra note 332 and accompanying text (outlining this Note's proposed res
ipsa defect test).
347. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-684; 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/13-213.
348. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-683; ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-116-104 (Michie 1987);
IND. CODE ANN. § 33-1-1.5-4 (Michie 1992); IOWA CODE ANN. § 668.12 (West 1987);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.59 (West 1991); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 537.764 (West
1988).
349. See IDAHO CODE § 6-1303 (1990) (limiting liability if the product is 10 years
old or older); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3303 (1983) (establishing a presumption that a
product 10 years old or older is not defective); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.310
(Michie 1992) (establishing a presumption that the product was not defective if the
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sumption that the product was not defective if the product con-
formed to all the proper regulations governing the product. 5 '
These defense measures do not bar res ipsa from strict liabili-
ty. State of the art defenses focus on the design of the product
and not its manufacture, because the goal of the restrictions is
to avoid design challenges to products that have been used for a
long period of time."5 ' Useful life limitations are consistent
with res ipsa loquitur. When useful life limitations are imposed
a legislature has determined that the probability is too remote
that the proximate cause of the injury was product defective-
ness. Therefore, the legislature has voted to disallow the exten-
sion of liability in circumstances covered by the statute.352 Fi-
nally, governmental standards often proffered as potential de-
fenses in design defect claims are less applicable to manufactur-
ing defect cases. In manufacturing defect claims, the plaintiff is
not trying to establish that the product did not conform to an
outside design standard; the plaintiff is trying to establish that
an individual product varied in a significant way from the prod-
uct norms established by the manufacturer.3 '
The final two types of legislative reform of products liability
law involve statute of limitations requirements and the admissi-
bility of evidence. Four states have outlined statute of limitation
requirements similar to the "useful life" defense that range from
six to twelve years." Three other states have enacted legisla-
injury occurred five or more years after the product was bought or eight or more
years after the product was manufactured); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.72.060 (West
1992) (creating a presumption that the product was not defective if the injury oc-
curred 12 or more years after the product was delivered).
350. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3304(a) (deeming a product not defective if it com-
plied with all relevant standards "relating to design or performance"); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 29-28-104 (1980) (establishing a rebuttable presumption that the product was
not unreasonably dangerous if it complied with government standards).
351. Cf IOWA CODE ANN. § 668.12 (denying liability if "the product conformed to
the state of the art in existence at the time the product was designed, tested, manu-
factured, . ..provided with a warning, or labeled") (emphasis added).
352. Cf KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.310 (establishing a presumption that a product
was not defective if the injury occurred five years or more after its purchase or
eight years or more after its manufacture).
353. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. b (Tentative
Draft No. 2, 1995); id. (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1994).
354. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-116-103 (Michie 1987) (requiring that the action be
brought within three years of the injury); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/13-213(b)
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tion limiting the admissibility of certain types of evidence to
prove product defectiveness.355
Again, the foregoing measures do not restrict the utility of res
ipsa in strict products liability actions. First, time limitations
are procedural in nature, not substantive. Second, after-acquired
evidence focuses more on design changes and applies less to
manufacturing defect claims. The res ipsa test focuses on the
nature of the specific product at the time of production, so the
inadmissibility of evidence regarding product changes or quality
control changes would not be highly probative of whether the
actual product in question was defective.
This Proposal Is Consistent with the Policy Goals of the Strict
Products Liability System
The presumptive use of res ipsa loquitur in manufacturing
defect cases is consistent with the American Law Institute's pro-
posed revisions of strict products liability and the policy goals
supporting the initial creation of the strict products liability le-
gal construct. The American Law Institute's revisions would
hold manufacturers strictly liable for manufacturing defects but
inject other qualifiers into the tests for design and warning de-
fect cases.356 Allowing res ipsa loquitur to assist in proving de-
fectiveness will ensure that the strictness of the liabilitjr will
hinge more on whether the product was actually defective and
less on whether the plaintiff could prove that the product was
(West 1993) (limiting the time period to 10 years from a product's sale to an initial
buyer or 12 years from the first sale of the product); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507-
D:2 (1983) (limiting claims to 12 years after manufacturer sold final product); OR.
REV. STAT. § 30.905 (Supp. 1996) (placing a time limit of eight years after the prod-
uct was first purchased); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28-103 (Supp. 1996) (setting the
time limit for bringing suit between six and 10 years).
355. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-404 (1987) (declaring inadmissible any evidence
regarding design theory, manufacturing technique, testing ability, or warning infor-
mation acquired after the product was sold); IDAHO CODE § 6-1306 (1990) (declaring
as inadmissible sibsequent remedial measures); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
600.2946(3) (West Supp. 1996) (admitting evidence of changes installed after the in-
jury "only for the purpose of proving the feasibility of precautions, if controverted or
for impeachment").
356. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 (Tentative Draft
No. 2, 1995).
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defective.
The use of res ipsa loquitur in strict liability claims will also
increase product safety. 57 With stricter liability, manufactur-
ers will have increased incentives to spend more money on qual-
ity control and to produce safer products because their risk of
liability will increase. 58 For the same reason, res ipsa loquitur
will further the enterprise liability theory of strict liability."9
If a manufacturer's ability to avoid liability for defective prod-
ucts decreases, the manufacturer will bear the costs of putting
defective products on the market more completely." ° By
forcing the manufacturer to bear more of the costs, res ipsa
loquitur shifts more accident costs to the manufacturer. This
means that the manufacturer, who can spread risk and insure
against risk better than consumers, will shoulder a greater por-
tion of the accident costs.36' Finally, res ipsa loquitur will as-
sist plaintiffs when proof is difficult to obtain. Just as strict
liability was created to aid plaintiffs when negligence was hard
to prove, res ipsa loquitur will act as a proof aid in strict liabili-
ty manufacturing defect cases. It will allow a plaintiff to make a
prima facie case of a manufacturing defect through the use of a
"common human experience" argument of defectiveness.6 2 Res
ipsa will allow the probability of defect to be sufficient to impose
liability instead of requiring an affirmative showing of a defect.
CONCLUSION
Res ipsa loquitur may have predated current strict liability
laws by 100 years,363 but the doctrine's inferential premise is
equally well-suited to the negligence and strict liability fields.
357. Cf. supra note 232 and accompanying text (noting that strict liability will lead
to increased safety).
358. See COMMERCE REPORT, supra note 232, at VI-47.
359. See Montgomery & Owen, supra note 229, at 809-10 (discussing the enterprise
liability theory generally).
360. See id.
361. See supra note 230 and accompanying text.
362. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328D cmt. c (1965) (noting that com-
mon experience holds that certain accidents do not occur absent negligence); see also
supra notes 193-225 and accompanying text (discussing states that have allowed the
use of common experience to infer defects in some manner).
363. See 1 SPEISER, supra note 1, § 1:2.
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Allowing the doctrine to assist plaintiffs in proving manufactur-
ing defect claims would be consistent with the American Law
Institute's recently proposed modifications to strict liability
law.3 More importantly, allowing the use of the doctrine
would ensure a level of strictness in strict liability manufactur-
ing claims that would further the policy goals of safety and en-
terprise liability at the core of strict liability for products that
fail to perform as intended.365
Merely allowing the use of the doctrine to provide an inference
of defect, however, does not sufficiently advance these goals. Res
ipsa loquitur, when used in manufacturing defect cases, should
be allotted a two-tiered presumptive effect determined by the
degree of the disparity of access to product information between
the plaintiff and the manufacturer. This proposal properly bal-
ances consumer, seller, and societal interests. It would advance
the interests of product safety and manufacturer responsibility
for defectively manufactured products without imposing absolute
liability on manufacturers and without requiring manufacturers
to be insurers of their products. Thus, it is time for the res ipsa
"barrel" to be rolled further out of the barn.
Matthew R. Johnson
364. See supra notes 272-75 and accompanying text.
365. See supra notes 228 and 232 and accompanying text.
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